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A Scienter Requirement for SEC Injunctions Under Section 10(b) —
Investor Protection Under the Securities Laws is Further Restricted: Aaron
v. SEC' — In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 2 the Supreme Court resolved a conflict
in the lower courts' by holding that proof of scienter was required in private
damage actions brought under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (1934 Act)* and rule 10b-5 5 thereunder. 6 The Hochfelder decision expressly
reserved the issue whether a similar standard should apply to injunctive actions
brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) to
enforce the provisions of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. 7 The Hochfelder Court's
' 446 U.S. 680 (1980).
2 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
3 See Cox, Ernst & Ernst u. Hochfelder: A Critique and an Evaluation of Its Impact upon the
Scheme of the Federal Securities Laws, 28 HASTINGS L. J. 569, 569-70 & nn.5-13 (1977).
4 See note 11 infra for the text of S 10(b).
See note 12 infra for the text of rule 106-5.
6 425 U.S. at 193. The concept of scienter has proved elusive. The term has been
defined to mean everything from knowing falsity to varying degrees of recklessness to such non-
action as would be equivalent to negligence or even liability without fault. 3 L. LOSS,
SECURITIES REGULATION 1432 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as LOSS]. Professor Bromberg
has gone so far as to suggest "[p]robably the most important step toward clarifying the law of
scienter would be to ban the word." 3 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD &
COMMODITIES FRAUD 5 8.4 (503), at 204.103 (1979).
Hochfelder did little to clarify the kind of conduct covered by its use of the term scienter. The
opinion makes clear only that a cause of action may not be predicated on negligent conduct. 425
U.S. at 214. Whether scienter encompasses reckless or knowing deception, or is limited to
intentional conduct, however, is not resolved by Hochfelder. In a footnote to its holding, the Court
stated, "(i]n this opinion the term `scienter' refers to a mental state embracing intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud." Id. at 193 n.12. This definition of scienter would limit its scope to
intentional conduct, At the same time, however, the court stated that the operative terms of 5 10(b)
"strongly suggest that 5 10(b) was intended to proscribe knowing or intentional misconduct." Id.
at 197. Under this construction, the scope of scienter is broadened to include knowing as well as
intentional deception. In addition, the Court refused to decide whether "scienter" encompassed
reckless conduct. Id. at 193 n.12. To include recklessness within the scope of scienter would
broaden the ambit of 5 10(b) even further.
' 425 U.S. at 194 n.12. Commission injunctive actions are expressly authorized by
5 20(b) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. 5 77t(b) (1976), and 5 21(d) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. S 78u(d)
(1976).
Private damage actions under 5 10(b), however, are not expressly authorized by statute, but
rather have been judicially implied. See, e.g., Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512,
513-14 (E. D. Pa. 1946) (first decision to imply the private cause of action). The language of 5 10(h)
makes no mention of a private cause of action for damages. See note 10 infra. Similarly, the
legislative history evinces no indication . . that Congress thought it was creating private rights
[in 5 10(b)]." 1 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD,
2.2 (333), at 2.23-2.24 (1979), See generally Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5: Judicial Revision of
Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw. U. L. REV. 627, 642-60 (1963); Note, Implied Liability Under the Securities
Exchange Act, 61 HARV. L. REV. 858, 861 (1948). Similarly, there is no indication that the Commis-
sion in adopting rule 1Ob-5 intended to create private civil remedies under this provision. See SEC
Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942), 7 Fed. Reg. 3804 (1942). See also Conference on the Codification of the
Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAW. 793, 922 (1967); Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 213 n.32.
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), was the first decision to
imply a private right of action under 5 10(b). Id. at 513-14. Thereafter, the existence of a private
damage action under the section has been accepted by all courts of appeals. The Supreme Court,
however, has never squarely held that a private cause of action exists under 5 10(b). Aaron v. SEC,
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analysis of section 10(b) and its insistence that "the language of the statute
controls" suggested that proof of scienter would also be required in Commission
injunctive actions to enforce that provision. 8 Analysis of the common law
remedies for fraud, and considerations of the policy and statutory scheme of the
federal securities acts, however, led many courts and commentators to reject a
scienter requirement for SEC injunctions . 8
Aaron v. SEC'° ended a lively dispute over the degree of culpability neces-
sary for an injunction to issue for violations of section 10(b). In an opinion
written by Justice Stewart, the Supreme Court held that the SEC must establish
scienter to enjoin violations of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act" and rule 10b-5' 2
446 U.S. 680, 689 (1980) (" [T] his court has repeatedly assumed the existence of an implied cause of
action under 5 10(b) and rule 10b-5.") (emphasis added).
8
 425 U.S. at 197-201, 214 n.33.
9 After Hochfelder, courts of appeals divided on the issue of whether scienter was required
in SEC injunctive actions. Compare SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that
scienter was required) with SEC v. Aaron, 605 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1979) and SEC v. World Radio
Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1976) (holding that scienter was not required).
Commentators were equally divided on the issue after Hochfelder. Compare Cox, Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder: A Critique and an Evaluation of Its Impact upon the Scheme of the Federal Securities Laws, 28
HASTINGS L. J. 569 (1977); Berner & Franklin, Scienter and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule
I0b-5 Injunctive Actions: A Reappraisal in Light of Hochfelder, 51 N.Y. U. L. REV. 769 (1976);
Lowenfels, Scienter or Negligence Required for SEC Injunctions under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5: A
Fascinating Paradox, 33 BUS. LAW. 789 (1978); Note, The Reach of the SEC Under Rule 10b-5 is Further
Restricted.. Negligent Conduct is Insufficient to Warrant Commission Instigated Injunctive Relief, 31 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 1524 (1977); Note, New Light on an Old Debate: Negligence v. Scienter in an SEC Fraud
Injunctive Suit, 51 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 759 (1977) (all arguing that scienter should be required in
Commission injunctive actions under $ 10(b) and rule 10b-5) with Note, Securities Regulation —
Courts Disagree Whether SEC Must Allege and Prove Scienter in Injunctive Actions Under Section 10(b) and
Rule 101)-5, 30 VAND. L. REV. 282 (1977); Comment, Scienter as an Element in SEC Enforcement
Actions, 82 DICK L. REV. 121 (1977); Note, Scienter's Scope and Application in Rule 106-5 Actions: An
Analysis in Light of Hochfelder, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 925 (1977); Note, Scienter and Injunctive Relief
Under Rule 10b-5, 11 GA. L. REV. 879 (1977); Note, The Scienter Requirement in SEC Injunctive Enforce-
ment of Section 10(b) After Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 77 COLUM. L. REV, 419 (1977); Note, Federal
Securities Regulation — Beyond Hochfelder: Is There a Scienter Requirement in SEC Suits for Injunctive Relief?,
22 VILL. L. REV. 1238 (1977); Note, SEC Injunctive Actions: A Negligence Standard Under Rule 106-5,
28 SYRACUSE L. REV. 763 (1977); Note, SEC Injunctive and Ancillary Relief Under Rule 106-5: A
Scienter Requirement?, 1977 U. ILL. L. F. 872; and Securities' Law: The Scienter Requirement In An SEC
Enforcement Action — Should Equity Control? — SEC v. Aaron, 5 U. DAY. L. REV. 217 (1980) (all
arguing that scienter is not required).
10 446 U.S. 680 (1980).
" 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) (1976). Section 10(b) applies to both buyers and sellers and provides
in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person directly or indirectly, by use of any means or instru-
mentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange—
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so . registered,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
' 2
 17 C.F. R.	 240.10b-5 (1979). Rule 10b-3 was promulgated by the Securities and
Exchange Commission in 1942. The rule provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any means or
March 1981]	 CASENOTES	 597
thereunder." The Court also ruled on the state of mind requirements for
violations of section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act).'4 The
proscriptions of section 17(a) apply only to deceptive practices in the offer or sale
of securities, whereas section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 prohibit deceptive practices in
either the purchase or sale of securities." The Court held that section 17(a)(1)
requires proof of scienter when enforced by SEC injunctions, but that section
17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) do not require proof of scienter."
The defendant in Aaron was a managerial employee at E. L. Aaron & Com-
pany (the firm), a registered broker-dealer" in securities." Between November
1974 and September 1975, two registered representatives of the firm who were
under Aaron's supervision conducted a sales campaign in which they repeatedly
made false and misleading statements while soliciting orders for the purchase of
common stock in Lawn-A-Mat Chemical & Equipment Corporation (Lawn-A-
Mat)." During the course of this promotion, the representatives told potential
investors that Lawn-A-Mat had plans to manufacture certain new lawn-care
products. 2° Lawn-A-Mat, however, had no such plans." The representatives
also made projections of substantial increases in the price of Lawn-A-Mat
common stock and optimistic statements concerning the company's financial
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.
Id.
446 U.S. at 701-02.
14 15 U.S.C. 77q(a) (1976). Section 17(a) applies only to sellers and provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the use of any
means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by
the use of the mails, directly or indirectly —
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material
fact or any omission to state a material fact necesFnry in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
Id.
'SCompare 5 17(a), note 14 supra, with § 10(b), note 11 supra, and rule 10b-5,
note 12 supra.
16 446 U.S, at 701-02.
" Broker-dealer: "A securities brokerage firm, usually registered with the S.E.C. and
with the State in which it does business, engaging in the business of buying and selling securities to
or for customers." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 175 (5th ed. 1979).
18 446 U.S. at 682.
19 Id. Lawn-A-Mat was engaged in the business of selling lawn-care franchises and
supplying its franchises with products and equipment. Id.
2° Id. Aaron & Co.'s registered representatives informed prospective investors that
Lawn-A-Mat was planning or in the process of manufacturing a new type of small car and tractor,
and that the car would be marketed within six weeks. Id.
21 Id.
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condition." Lawn-A-Mat, however, was losing money during the relevant
period. 23 Although counsel for Lawn-A-Mat informed Aaron that his represent-
atives were making false and misleading statements, 24
 the defendant took no
affirmative steps to prevent the recurrence of such misrepresentations."
Aaron's only response was to inform one of the two representatives of Lawn-A-
Mat's complaint and to direct him to communicate directly with counsel for
Lawn-A-Mat." Otherwise, defendant Aaron did nothing to prevent the two
registered representatives under his direct supervision from continuing to make
false and misleading statements while promoting Lawn-A-Mat common stock."
The Securities and Exchange Commission brought an enforcement action
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York to
enjoin Aaron and his representatives from continuing these deceptive practices
in connection with the offer and sale of Lawn-A-Mat securities." The Commis-
sion charged Aaron with violating and with aiding and abetting violations of
three provisions of the securities laws: section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, section 10(b)
of the 1934 Act, and rule 10b-5. 29
 The Commission alleged that Aaron had
22 Id. at 682-83.
28 Id. at 683.
" Id. Milton Kean, an attorney representing Lawn-A-Mat, communicated to Aaron by
telephone on two occasions the substance of the inaccurate statements made by Aaron's represent-
atives. Id. Aaron, in addition to being so informed by Kean, had reason to know of the falsity of the
statements. His responsibility for maintaining the firm's due diligence files should have indicated
a deteriorating financial condition and revealed no plans for manufacturing a new car and tractor.
Id.
25 Id.
26 Id .
27 Id.
28 Id. The SEC filed a complaint in the district court against Aaron and seven other
defendants for deceptive conduct in connection with the offer and sale of Lawn-A-Mat common
stock. Id. Before commencement of the trial, all defendants in the action except Aaron consented
to the entry of permanent injunctions against them. Id. at 684.
The Securities and Exchange Commission is authorized by $ 20(b) of the 1933 Act to bring
injunctive actions to enforce the statute and rules promulgated thereunder, 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b)
(1976). Section 20(b) provides:
Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person is engaged or about to
engage in any acts or practices which constitute or will constitute a violation of the
provisions of this subchapter,
	
17(a),] or of any rule or regulation prescribed under
the authority thereof, it may in its discretion, bring an action in any district court of the
United States . .. to enjoin such acts or practices, and upon a proper showing a
permanent or temporary injunction or restraining order shall be granted without bond.
Id. Similarly, 21(d) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. S 78u(d) (1976), authorizes the Commission to
seek injunctive relief whenever it appears that a person "is engaged or is about to engage in acts or
practices constituting" a violation of the provisions of the 1934 Act (e.g. , § 10(b)), or regulations
promulgated thereto (e.g., rule 10b-5), and requires a district court "upon a proper showing" to
grant injunctive relief. Id.
29
 446. U.S. at 683-84. The Commission also charged Aaron and three other defendants
with violating and aiding and abetting violations of the registration provisions of sections 5(a) and
5(c) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(a) and 77e(c) (1976), in connection with the offer and sale of
Lawn-A-Mat stock. Id. at 684 n.l. The district court found that Aaron had violated these provi-
sions and enjoined him from future violations. [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 96,043, at 91,686-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). The court of appeals affirmed this holding, 605
F.2d 612, 617-19 (2d Cir. 1979), and petitioner Aaron did not challenge this portion of the court of
appeals' decision. 446 U.S. at 684 n.l.
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actual or constructive knowledge that the employees under his supervision were
engaged in fraudulent practices, but failed to take adequate steps to prevent
those practices from continuing."
The district court found that Aaron had violated and aided and abetted
violations of section 17(a), section 10(b), and rule 10b-5 during the Lawn-A-Mat
sales campaign and enjoined him from future violations of these provisions. 3'
On the issue of the proper standard for liability in Commission enforcement pro-
ceedings under these provisions, the district court concluded that while a show-
ing of negligence alone might suffice," Aaron's intentional failure to prevent his
representatives from making false and misleading statements, while knowing
such statements to be fraudulent, was sufficient to establish his scienter under
the securities laws . 33
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the district court's
grant of a permanent injunction against Aaron. 34 In so ruling, the circuit court
addressed the issue of whether proof of scienter is a necessary element of a Com-
mission enforcement action to enjoin violations of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act
or of section 17(a) of the 1933 Act." With regard to section 10(b), the court of
appeals found it unnecessary to review the determination of the district court
that Aaron's conduct supported a finding of scienter. 36 Instead, the court
concluded the scienter requirement of Hochfelder was not applicable to SEC
injunctive actions and held that the SEC need only show proof of negligence to
enjoin violations of section 10(b). 37 The circuit court noted that its previous
decisions had anticipated Hochfelder in holding that scienter was required in
private damage actions under section 10(b). 38 At the same time, however, the
Second Circuit had also consistently held that section 10(b) does not require
proof of scienter when enforced by Commission injunctions." This distinction
was premised on the different purposes and policies of the two types of civil
enforcement suits under section 10(b). 40 Whereas actions for damages are
3° Id. at 684.
[1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP (CCH) / 96,043, at 91,685, 91,686-87.
An injunction was issued even though the firm had gone bankrupt and Aaron was no longer work-
ing for a broker-dealer. The district court stated that the standard governing the issuance of an
injunction in Commission enforcement actions is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the
violations will be repeated. Id. at 91,686. The court reasoned that since Aaron was currently work-
ing in the related field of commodities trading and had expressed at trial a strong interest in return-
ing to the securities industry, a likelihood of future violations was present. Id. The court concluded
that the "nature and extent of the violations . . . [and the petitioner's] failure to recognize the
wrongful nature of his conduct" warranted injunctive relief. Id. at 91,686-87.
32 Id. at 91,685.
" Id.
" SEC v. Aaron, 605 F.2d 612, 624 (2c1 Cir. 1979).
" Id. at 619.
36 Id.
37 Id.
3° Id. at 620. See, e.g. , Lanza v. Drexel, 479 F.2d 1277, 1304-06 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc);
Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442, 445 (2d Cir. 1971).
" 605 F.2d at 620-21.
4° Id. at 621. The court of appeals did not explain the policy considerations underlying
the federal securities act upon which it relied, but cited as supporting authority SEC v. Spectrum,
Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 541-42 (2d Cir. 1973) ("In the distribution of unregistered securities, the prep-
aration of an opinion letter is too essential and the reliance of the public too high to permit due
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designed to provide compensation for individual investors, suits for injunctive
relief serve to provide maximum protection for the investing public.'t In
accordance with its view of the protective, rather than punitive, function of
Commission injunctions, 12
 the court concluded that the increased effectiveness
of Commission enforcement actions under a negligence standard outweighed
the danger of potential harm to those enjoined from violating the securities
laws."
The court of appeals supported its policy oriented holding by observing that
the language of section 10(b) was not sufficiently clear to control the issue," and
that the legislative history of that section "is bereft of any explicit explanation of
Congress' intent." 45
 The court found a more persuasive guide for construing
the contours of section 10(b) in the legislative history of section 21(d) of the 1934
Act." Section 21(d) authorizes the SEC to bring injunctive actions to enforce the
prohibitions of section 10(b).47
 The court was convinced that legislative discus-
sion of that provision clearly indicated that Congress did not intend a scienter
requirement for Commission injunctions." Finally, the circuit court was satis-
fied that rejecting a scienter requirement for Commission injunctions to enforce
section 10(b) was consistent with the overall enforcement scheme of the federal
securities acts."
After concluding that negligence was the proper standard for liability under
section 10(b)," the court of appeals proceeded to affirm the rule enunciated in its
prior decisions that scienter is also not required in a Commission injunctive
diligence to be cast aside in the name of convenience." The public interest in accuracy of registra-
tion statements outseighs the potential burden of complying with due diligence requirements.) and
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854-55 (2d Cir. 1968) ("In an enforcement pro-
ceeding for equitable or prophylactic relief, the common law standard of deceptive conduct has
been modified in the interests of broader protection for the investing public so that negligent . .
conduct has become unlawful.") Id. at 854-55. ("[T]he securities laws should be interpreted as an
expansion of the common law .. to effectuate the broad remedial design of Congress.") Id. at
855.
41 605 F.2d at 621.
42 Id. " The essential nature of an SEC enforcement action is equitable and prophylactic;
its primary purpose is to protect the public against harm, not to punish the offender." Id. (quoting
SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020, at 1027-28 (2d Cir. 1978)).
" 605 F.2d at 621.
" Id.
" Id. (quoting Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 201).
" Id. at 621-22.
" See note 28 supra for the relevant text of § 21(d).
" 605 F.2d at 622 n.14. The court found support for its reading of § 21(d) in the legislative
history of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, id. at n.14, and the legislative reports to the Securities Acts
Amendments of 1975, which amended § 21(d). Id. at 622.
* 9 Id. at 622. The circuit court stated that Hochfelder reflected a concern that the absence
of a scienter requirement for private damage actions under § 10(b) would render superfluous the
statutory scheme of "express civil liability," and would significantly broaden the class of plaintiffs
who could sue under this provision. Id. The court of appeals found no comparable provisions that
would be nullified by permitting SEC enforcement actions to be predicated on a showing of negli-
gence. Id. at 623. To the contrary, the court of appeals concluded that "to sanction § 10(b)
injunctive relief on proof of negligence would be to harmonize the requirements of that section
with the standards governing similar prophylactic provisions of the 1933 Act." Id.
" Id. at 623.
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action under section 17(a) of the 1933 Act. 5' The court based its reading of sec-
tion 17(a) on its reasoning concerning section 10(b) and its previous decision in
SEC v. Coven. 52 In Coven, the court had observed that the language of section
17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) gives no indication that civil liability was to be predicated
on a showing of scienter." The Coven court also found its reading of section 17(a)
to be in accord with the legislative history of that section, stating that although
Congress had considered a scienter requirement under that provision, instead it
had "opted for liability without willfulness, intent to defraud, or the like.'"*
Finally, the Coven court found nothing in the structure of remedies provided in
the securities acts to suggest a scienter requirement under section 17(a) when
enforced by commission injunctions . 55
Having determined that negligence was the appropriate standard of
liability under sections 10(b) and 17(a), the court of appeals then considered
whether the district court erred in enjoining defendant Aaron from committing
further violations of the securities laws . 56 The court stated that the critical issue
in determining whether the public interest requires the imposition of a
permanent injunction is "whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the
wrong will be repeated." 57 The court further stated that the commission of
fraudulent acts in the past gives rise to an inference that such conduct may recur
in the future." In applying these principles to the instant case, the court
determined that the nature of Aaron's past violations, which were rather
flagrant and committed with scienter, and Aaron's continued protestations of
innocence, were significant indicia of likely future misconduct." The court of
appeals thus concluded that a likelihood of future violations was indeed present,
and proceeded to affirm the district court's grant of a permanent injunction
against Aaron . 6°
The Supreme Court granted defendant Aaron's petition for certiorari 61 and
reversed the court of appeals . 62 The court HELD: the Commission must estab-
Aish scienter63 to enjoin violations of section 17(a)(1) of the 1933 Act, section
51 Id.
52 Id.
" 581 F.2d 1020, 1026 (2d Cir. 1978). See note 14 supra for the text of 5 17(a).
55 581 F.2d at 1027.
" Id. at 1027. The circuit court observed that if a private action for damages were recog-
nized under 17(a), and if scienter were not required, the effect might be to negate the limitations
on private actions for negligence contained in 55 II, 12(2), and 15 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
77k, 771(2), and 77o. 581 F.2d at 1027. While this structural consideration might auger for a
scienter requirement in private actions under 5 17(a), the court of appeals found it to be irrelevant
as a basis for limiting liability with regard to SEC enforcement proceedings. Id.
56 605 F.2d at 623.
57 Id .
58 Id. at 624.
59 Id.
6° Id.
61 444 U.S. 914 (1979).
62 446 U.S. at 702.
65 The Court did not elaborate on the meaning of scienter beyond stating: "[t]he term
`scienter' is used throughout this opinion, as it was in Ernst & Ernst u. Hochfelder to refer to 'a mental
state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.' We have no occasion here to address
the question, reserved in Hochfelder, whether, . . . scienter may also include reckless behavior."
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10(b) of the 1934 Act, and rule 10b-5 promulgated under that section of the 1934
Act." The Court further held that the Commission need not establish a
defendant's scienter to enjoin violations of section 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) of the
1933 Act. 65
This casenote will exmine the question whether the Aaron Court was correct
in holding that section 10(b) requires proof of scienter when enforced by Com-
mission injunctions. The merits of the Court's reasoning will be evaluated and
tested against an approach which would rely less on Hochfelder and the proble-
matical stautory language of section 10(b) and more on factors which distinguish
Commission injunctive actions from private actions for damages under that
section. Analysis of the components of the Hochfelder opinion reveals the ques-
tionable precedential value of that decision for the issue before the Aaron Court.
An inquiry focusing instead on the common law remedies for fraud, the legis-
lative policy and statutory scheme of the 1934 Act, and the legislative history of
amendments to the 1934 Act demonstrates that SEC injunctive relief should not
be limited by a scienter requirement. It is submitted that Aaron was wrongly, or
at least improvidently, decided. By requiring the SEC to prove scienter in most
situations before it may obtain an injunction, the Court unnecessarily undercuts
the Commission's authority to police the marketplace. Neither in Hochfelder nor
in Aaron, however, did the Court clearly define the meaning of "scienter" under
section 10(b). 66
 Accordingly, it is submitted that the same considerations that
militate against the imposition of a scienter standard in enforcement actions
argue just as persuasively in favor of an expanded interpretation of the meaning
of "scienter" in such actions.
I. THE AARON DECISION
At the outset of its opinion, the Court delineated a bifurcated approach for
determining whether scienter may be a ncessary element in SEC enforcement
proceedings. 67
 Under this approach, a court must determine first whether the
substantive provision allegedly violated requires a showing of scienter, and
second, whether the statutory provision authorizing injunctive relief requires
446 U.S. at 686 n.5. (citations omitted). The Court thus eschewed the task of clarifying the con-
fused meaning of "scienter" as used in Hochfelder. See n.6 supra.
64 446 U.S. at 701-02.
" Id. at 702. Chief Justice Burger concurred with the opinion of the majority. Id. at
702-03. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, concurred in part and
dissented in part. Id. at 703-18.
66 See notes 6 & 63 supra.
" 446 U.S. at 689. After stating that "resolution of [the scienter issue] could depend
upon (1) the substantive provisions of 5 17(a), 5 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, or (2) the statutory provi-
sions authorizing injunctive relief . . . ," the Court then stated that it would examine "each" to
determine the extent to which the respective provisions "may require proof of scienter." Id.
Although the use of the word "or" might be construed as an assertion by the Court that the
scienter issue could be resolved by reference to either the substantive provisions alone or the provi-
sions authorizing injunctive relief alone, the Court's determination to examine "each" set of pro-
visions, and its unwillingness to rule on the Commission's burden of proof in enforcement actions
until it had completed its two step analysis, indicates the Court thought this bifurcated approach
was mandatory.
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scienter." As applied to the instant case, this two-tiered test required first, an
examination of the substantive provisions at issue, section 17(a) of the 1933 Act,
section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, and rule 10b-5," and second, a determination
whether the provisions authorizing injunctive relief, section 20(b) of the 1933
Act, and section 21(d) of the 1934 Act, modify the substantive provisions so far
as scienter is concerned. 70 Only after completing this two step analysis was the
Court prepared to rule on whether the Commission must establish scienter to
enjoin violations of section 17(a) and section 10(b). 7 '
As the first step of its analysis, the Court examined section 10(b). It found
as compelling precedent Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder. 72 The Hochfelder Court based
its conclusion that scienter was required in private damage actions under section
10(b) on the text and legislative history of that provision, and the statutory
scheme of the 1933 and 1934 Acts." The Aaron Court, unwilling to acknowledge
"policy" as a basis for the Hochfelder conclusion," began its discussion of the
state of mind required for injunctive liability under section 10(b) by
summarizing the reasoning of Hochfelder. The Court stated first that Hochfelder
had deemed the text of section 10(b) to "quite clearly evince a congressional
intent to proscribe only 'knowing or intentional misconduct."'" The Aaron
Court continued by observing that the legislative history of that provision,
though "bereft of any explicit explanation of Congress' intent," contained "no
indication . . . that $ 10(b) was intended to proscribe conduct not involving
scienter." 76 The Aaron Court then took note of the concern expressed in
68 Id.
69 Id. at 689-700. In part II, section A of its opinion, the Aaron Court discussed the issue
of a scienter requirement under $ 10(b). Id. at 689-95. In part II, section B, the Court examined
the issue of scienter under 5 17(a). Id. at 695-700.
's Id. at 700-01. (part II, section C).
71 Id.
72 Id. at 690, 691, 695.
" See 425 U.S. at 197-214. Although the Hochfelder Court was unwilling to rely expressly
on "policy" to support its decision, policy considerations may well have been the underlying
foundation for those supports on which the Court expressly relied. At the conclusion of its opinion,
the Hochfelder Court stated that since "the language and history of 5 10(b) [are] dispositive of the
appropriate standard of liability," it had no occasion to examine "considerations of 'policy' set
forth by the parties." 425 U.S. at 214 n.33. After making this disclaimer, however, the Court
proceeded to note that "the standard urged by respondents would significantly broaden the class
of plaintiffs who may seek to impose liability upon [experts rendering opinions] with respect to
matters under the Acts." Id. In a more general vein, the Court reiterated its concern previously
expressed in Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 747-48, that "the inexorable broadening of the class of
plaintiff who may sue in this area of the law will ultimately result in more harm than good." Id.
The Hochfelder Court concluded by stating "[a]cceptance of respondents' view would extend new
frontiers to the 'hazards' of rendering expert advice under the Acts, raising serious policy ques-
tions not yet addressed by Congress." Id. Thus, it appears that the Hachfelder Court was quite con-
cerned about the policy ramifications of a relaxed standard of liability under S 10(b). This view of
Hochfelder was endorsed by Justice Blackmun in his dissent in Aaron, where he stated that the
"broadening of the class of plaintiff who may sue in this area of the law .. . has been an animating
concern of the Court's decisions limiting the scope of private damage actions under 5 10(b)." 446
U.S. at 713 n.4. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice Blackmun cited as support
for this proposition footnote 33 of the Hochfelder opinion. Id.
74 Compare 446 U.S. at 690.91 & n.9 with 425 U.S. at 214 n.33.
" 446 U.S. at 690.
76 Id.
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Hochfelder that premising civil liability under section 10(b) would upset the
statutory scheme." The Hochfelder Court had observed that when Congress
intended a negligence standard under other provisions of the 1933 and 1934
Acts, it said so expressly" and subjected such actions to significant procedural
restraints not applicable to section 10(b).' 9
 Finally, the Hochfelder Court con-
cluded by reasoning that since the Commission's rule-making power is neces-
sarily limited to its statutory authority, rule 10b-5 must likewise be restricted to
conduct involving scienter. 8°
After reviewing its reasoning in Hochfelder, the Aaron Court concluded that
since the language and legislative history of section 10(b) apply with equal force
to private damage actions and Commission injunctive actions, scienter must be
an element of a violation of that provision "regardless of the identity of the
77 Id.
" 425 U.S. at 207. The Hochfelder Court referred to 5 11 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C.
5 77k (1976) as an example of an express civil remedy allowing recovery for negligent conduct. 425
U.S. at 208-09. The Court characterized the "due diligence" defense accorded experts and
accountants under 5 11(b)(3)(B)(i), 15 U.S.C. S 77k(b)(3)(B)(i) as "in effect" a negligence
standard. 425 U.S. at 208. "An expert may avoid civil liability with respect to the portions of the
registration statement for which he was responsible by showing that 'after reasonable investiga-
tion' he had 'reasonable ground[s] to believe' that the statements for which he was responsible
were true and there was no omission of a material fact." Id. at 208. The Court noted that other
individuals who sign the registration statement, directors of the issuer, and the underwriter of the
securities, are also accorded a complete defense against civil liability based on the exercise of
reasonable investigation and a reasonable belief that the registration statement was not misleading
under 55 11(b)(3)(A), (C), (D), 15 U.S.C. S 77k(b)(3)(A), (C), (D) (1976). 425 U.S. at 208 n.26.
The Hochfelder Court's characterization of the "due diligence" defense under 5 11 as in effect a
negligence standard is not entirely accurate. In a typical negligence action, the plaintiff must show
that defendant failed to exercise due care. In a suit under 5 11, however, the defendant bears the
burden of coming forward with evidence that he exercised reasonable care in helping to prepare
the registration statement.
The Hochfelder Court also asserted that a negligence standard obtains under sections
12(2) and 15 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. 55 77(2) and 77o, but did not expand on this statement.
425 U.S. at 208-09.
79 Id. Section 11(e) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. 5 77k(e) (1976), authorizes courts to re-
quire plaintiffs suing under 55 11, 5 12(2), or 5 15 to post a bond for costs, including attorneys'
fees. Judicial construction of this provision generally has required posting of bond only where the
action does not appear likely to succeed. Dabney v. Alleghany Corp., 164 F. Supp. 28, 33
(S.D. N.Y. 1958). Section 11(c) also authorizes a court to assess costs at the conclusion of the
litigation, in specified circumstances. Section 13, 15 U.S.C. 5 77m (1976), imposes a statute of
limitations of one year applicable to actions brought under 55 11, 12(2), and 15, running from
the time the violation was or should have been discovered, and in no event to exceed three years
from the time the security was offered to the public. 425 U.S. at 210.
There is no statute of limitations provided for civil actions under 5 10(b). Thus, the statute of
limitations of the forum state is followed as in other cases of judicially implied remedies. See, e.g.,
Holmberg v. Arinbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946). Generally, state statutes of limitations are
longer than the one-year period provided under 5 13. 3 Loss, supra note 4, at 1773-74. In a 5 10(b)
suit, there is no bond-posting requirement, and a district court's power to award attorneys' fees is
sharply limited. See, e.g. , F. D. Rich Co. v. United States ex. rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S.
116, 129 (1974) ("attorneys' fees may be awarded to a successful party when his opponent has
acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons").
8° 446 U.S. at 691. In Hachfelder, the Court observed that "[v]iewed in isolation the
language of subsection (b), and arguably that of subsection (c) [of rule 10b-5] could be read as
proscribing" conduct not involving scienter. 425 U.S. at 212.
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plaintiff or the nature of the relief sought." 81 The Aaron Court admitted that the
third prong of the Hochfelder analysis, the structure of civil liability provisions in
the 1933 and 1934 Acts, had no applicability to the instant case. 82 Nevertheless,
the Court maintained that the language of the statute was dispositive in
Hochfelder, thus intimating that the remaining grounds for the conclusion in
Hochfelder were mere dicta."
The Court's strict reliance on the language of the statute, as construed by
Hochfelder, differed sharply from the approach urged by the SEC. The Commis-
sion had argued that it was more appropriate to construe section 10(b) by
reference to cases involving Commission suits for injunctive relief than to focus
solely on Hochfelder, which involved a private damage action. 84 Accordingly, the
Commission urged the Court to follow the reasoning of SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau. 85 In Capital Gains, the Supreme Court held that in an SEC
enforcement action 86 against an investment advisor for deceptive conduct
proscribed by section 206(2) of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 87 the Com-
mission is not required to prove intent to defraud. 88 The Court had based its
conclusion on evidence of legislative intent," developments in the common law
" 446 U.S. at 691.
82 Id. at 691 n.9.
" Id.
" Id. at 691-94.
" 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
86 The statutory provision pursuant to which the SEC sought injunctive relief in Capital
Gains was 5 209(e) of the Investment Advisors Act, 15 U.S.C. 80b-9(e) (1976), which provides in
relevant part:
Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person has engaged, is engaged, or
is about to engage in any act or practice constituting a violation of any provision of this
subchapter, or of any rule, regulation, or order hereunder, . .. it may in its discretion
bring an action in the proper district court of the United States ... to enjoin such acts or
practices . . . . Upon a showing that such person has engaged, is engaged, or is about to
engage in any such act or practice, . . a permanent or temporary injunction or decree
or restraining order shall be granted without bond.
Id.
Section 209(e) is similar to 5 20(b) of the 1933 Act and 5 21(d) of the 1934 Act. See note 28
supra. One distinction between the provisions authorizing injunctive relief, however, is that under
5 209(e) of the Investment Advisors Act, the SEC may obtain an injunction upon a bare showing
of past violations of the Act; under 5 20(b) and 5 21(d) of the 1933 and 1934 Acts the Commission
may obtain injunctive relief only upon a showing that defendant is presently violating, or is about
to violate a provision of the Act. See note 28 supra.
"? 15 U.S.C. 80b-6 (1976). This section prohibits any act or practice of an investment
advisor that "operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client." Note the
similarity to 5 17(a)(3) of the 1933 Act, set forth in note 14 supra.
The injunction sought in Capital Gains was to require investment advisors to disclose to their
clients whether they were engaged in "scalping" the securities they recommended. Scalping refers
to a practice whereby an investment adviser purchases shares of a security for his own account
shortly before recommending the same security to investors, and then promptly sells his shares at a
profit upon the rise in their market value following the recommendation. 375 U.S. at 181, 183.
ss 375 U.S. at 195.
88 Id. at 186-92. The Court observed that the legislative history of the Investment
Advisors Act reflected both a broad congressional intent "to eliminate, or at least to expose, all
conflicts of interest which might incline an investment adviser — consciously or unconsciously —
to render advice which was not disinterested," id. at 191-92, and a specific intent to prohibit
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of fraud,9° and the practical effect of a scienter requirement on achieving the
purposes of the legislation. 9' The Court stressed that the Commission's suit was
equitable in nature and that in such suits the common law did not require proof
of scienter. 92 The Capital Gains Court thus sought to harmonize the requirements
for equitable relief from fraud with the requirements for Commission injunc-
tions under the securities laws.
In Aaron, the Commission argued that the emphasis in Capital Gains upon
the distinction between fraud at law and fraud in equity should guide a construc-
tion of section 10(b) in a Commission suit for injunctive relief." The Aaron Court
refused to be guided by the reasoning of Capital Gains, however, and proceeded
to distinguish the provision at issue in Capital Gains from section 10(b) on three
grounds: legislative history, statutory language, and the type of transaction
regulated. The Court first noted that while there was "strong support" in the
legislative history for the conclusion in Capital Gains that the Commission need
not prove intent to enjoin violations of section 206(2), 94 the legislative history of
section 10(b) "points towards a scienter requirement." 95 Secondly, the Court
observed that the provision at issue in Capital Gains, which makes unlawful any
practice "which operates . . . as a fraud or deceit," focuses on the fraudulent
effect of a particular practice, and not on the state of mind of the investment
advisor." By contrast, the language of section 10(b) refers to "knowing or
intentional misconduct."" Finally, the Court noted that the statutory provision
involved in Capital Gains regulated the "special fiduciary relationship" between
an investment advisor and his client, whereas section 10(b) "applies with equal
force" to both fiduciary and nonfiduciary transactions in securities." The Court
"trading by investment counselors for their own account in securities in which their clients were
interested." Id. at 189. In light of this evidence, the Court reasoned that requiring proof of scienter
would run counter to the expressed intent of Congress. Id. at 192.
9° Id. at 192-95.
91 Id. at 200-01. The practical difficulty of proving scienter, the Court insisted, would
nullify the protective purposes of the statute. Id. at 200. It was the Court's view that requiring the
courts or the Commission to "separate the mental urges of an investment advisor" would frustrate
the policy of maintaining "public confidence in the securities industry" and preserving "the
economic health of the country." Id. at 200, 201.
92 Id. at 192-95. "Fraud has a broader meaning in equity [than at law] and inten-
tion to defraud or to misrepresent is not a necessary element." Id. at 194 (quoting W. DEFUNIAK,
HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQUITY 235 (2d ed. 1956) (brackets in original)).
The Court also noted that in a suit against a fiduciary such as an investment adviser, it was
not necessary to establish all the elements of fraud that would be required in a suit against a party
to an arms-length transaction. Id.
" 446 U.S. at 693-94.
" Id. at 694.
" Id. This observation, which the Court said was supported by the Hochfelder opinion, is
not entirely accurate. The legislative history of 5 10(b) was the weakest ground for the Hochfelder
holding. In discussing the import of the hearings and reports it reviewed, the Hochfelder Court was
only able to say "[t]here is no indication . . . that 5 10(b) was intended to proscribe conduct not
involving scienter." 425 U.S. at 202. Moreover, the Aaron Court expressly stated that "the
language of the statute . . was sufficient, standing alone, to support the Court's conclusion that
scienter is required in a private damage action under 5 10(b)." 446 U.S. at 691 n.9. Thus, the
value of the excursion into the legislative history of 5 10(b) by the Court in Hochfelder is unclear.
96
 446 U.S. at 694.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 694-95. In the past, some courts had considered the status of the defendant as a
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concluded, therefore, that Hochfelder, rather than Capital Gains was the con-
trolling precedent, and laid down the flat rule that under all circumstances,
scienter is a necessary element of a violation of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. 99
After ruling on section 10(b), the Court then turned to the issue whether
proof of scienter is a necessary element of a violation of section 17(a) of the 1933
Act.'" The Court concluded that scienter is an element of a section 17(a)(1) vio-
lation, but not of violations under sections 17(a)(2) or 17(a)(3).'°' Although both
Aaron and the SEC urged the Court to adopt a uniform culpability requirement
under section 17(a),'" the Court insisted that the text of section 17(a) was
drafted in such a manner as to "compel the conclusion that scienter is required
under one subparagraph but not under the other two."'" In this regard, the
Court found the terms "device," "scheme," and "artifice" contained in sub-
paragraph (1) of section 17(a)'° 4 to all connote conduct involving scienter.'" In
contrast, the Court found the language of subparagraph (2), which prohibits
obtaining money or property "by means of any untrue statement of a material
fact or any omission to state a material fact," 1°6 to be devoid of any suggestion of
a scienter requirement.'" Similarly, the Court construed subparagraph (3),
which makes unlawful practices which "operate or would operate as a fraud or
deceit,' "" as focusing on the effect of particular conduct on members of the
investing public, rather than upon the culpability of the perpetrator.'" It there-
fore determined that scienter was inappropriate as a precondition for liability
under section 17(a)(3). 11° Convinced that its linguistic analysis of section 17(a)
was correct,' the Court proceded to discuss the legislative history of the pro-
vision ." 2 The Commission contended that the elimination of specific language
of intent 113 from earlier drafts of section 17(a) indicated that Congress had
considered and rejected a scienter requirement under all three clauses of the
fiduciary or nonfiduciary in determining either the need to prove scienter or the degree of scienter
required to be shown, See, e.g., Edwards & Hanly v. Wells Fargo Securities Clearance Corp., 602
F.2d 478, 485 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1045 (1980); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon &
Co., Inc., 570 F.2d 38, 44-45 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978).
°9 446 U.S. at 695.
'°° Id. While noting that it was "cognizant" that "Congress intended securities legisla-
tion enacted for the purpose of avoiding frauds to be construed not technically and restrictively,
but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes," the Court at the outset of its discussion reiterated
its recently expressed view that "generalized references to the remedial purposes of the securities
laws will not justify reading a provision more broadly than its statutory language and the statutory
scheme reasonably permit." Id. (citations omitted).
101 446 U.S. at 697.
102 Id.
1 ° 3 Id.
104 See note 14 supra for the text of section 17(a)(1).
1 ° 5 446 U.S. at 696.
100 See note 14 supra for the text of section 17(a)(2).
'° 7 446 U.S. at 696.
108 See note 14 supra for the text of section 17(a)(3).
109 446 U.S. at 697.
110 Id.
"I Id.
12 Id. at 697-700.
in Id. at 698-99. Earlier drafts of section 17(a) had contained the word "willfully" at the
beginning of the provision. In addition, the phrase "with intent to defraud" had modified the first
clause "to employ any device, scheme, or artifice." Id.
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provision." The Court rejected this argument, however, emphasizing that the
Conference report did not address the question of scienter under section 17(a)."
The Court thus determined that the legislative history, although ambiguous,
could be read in a manner consistent with the plain meaning of section 17(a)." 6
Concluding its discussion of section 17(a), the Court refused to entertain policy
arguments advanced by the parties, asserting that "the language and legislative
history of 17(a) are dispositive." " 7
Proceding from its conclusion that sections 10(b) and 17(a)(1) embody a
scienter requirement, while sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) do not, the Court
moved to the second tier of its analysis to determine whether the provisions
authorizing injunctive relief, section 20(b) of the 1933 Act and 21(d) of the 1934
Act,"8
 "modify the substantive provisions at issue .. . so far as scienter is con-
cerned ." " 9
 The Court summarily concluded that neither the language nor the
legislative history of these provisions indicated a congressional intent to add to
or detract from the requisite showing of scienter under section 10(b) or section
17(a).'2 ° Having completed its bifurcated test for ascertaining whether scienter is
required in SEC enforcement procedings, the Court was then able to hold that,
with respect to section 10(b) and section 17(a)(1) violations, the Commission
must establish scienter to obtain injunctive relief, but need not establish scienter
to enjoin violations of sections 17(a)(1) and 17(a)(2). 121
"I Id. at 699.
115 Id.
"6
 Id. at 699-700.
17 Id. at 700 n.19.
"8
 Section 20(b) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. 77t(b) (1976), authorizes the Commission
to bring injunctive actions to enforce the provisions of the statute and the rules promulgated there-
under. See note 28 supra for the text of 5 20(b). Section 21(d) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. 5 78u(d)
(1976), authorizes the Commission to bring injunctive actions to enforce the 1934 Act. See note 28
supra for the relevant portion of 5 21(d).
118 446 U.S. at 700.
12° Id. In the context of the issue of a scienter requirement under 5 10(b), the Court
considered the subsequent legislative history of 5 21(d) of the 1934 Act. The Commission had
argued that its administrative interpretation of 5 10(b) as not requiring proof of scienter in
injunctive proceedings enjoyed congressional approval. Id. at 694 n.11. Congress had been
expressly informed of the Commission's interpretation on two occasions when significant amend-
ments to the securities laws were enacted — the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No.
94-29, 89 Stat. 97, and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat.
1494 — and on each occasion Congress left the administrative interpretation undisturbed. See S.
REP. No. 94-75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1975), reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONC. & AD.
NEWS 179; H. R. REP. NO. 95-640, 95th Cong,, 1st Sess. 10 (1977). The Court, however, was not
impressed. It stated that since "the legislative consideration of those statutes was addressed
principally to matters other than at issue here, . . the failure of Congress to overturn the Com-
mission's interpretation falls far short of . . . support[ing] a construction of 5 10(b) so clearly at
odds with its plain meaning and legislative history." 446 U.S. at 694 n.11.
121 Id, at 701-02. Although the Court held that the Commission need not establish
scienter to enjoin violations of 55 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3), the Court took pains to emphasize that a
defendant's scienter would have some bearing on a district court's decision to enjoin persons
violating or about to violate subparagraphs (2) or (3) of 5 17(a). Id. at 701. The Court noted that
where the Commission is seeking to enjoin persons about to engage in acts which will constitute a
violation of those provisions, "the Commission must establish a sufficient evidentiary predicate
to show that such future violations may occur." Id. at 701 (citations omitted). The Court further
stated that an important factor in establishing this evidentiary foundation is "the degree of inten-
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In dissent, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall,
argued that neither section 17(a)(1) of the 1933 Act, nor section 10(b) of the 1934
Act requires the SEC to prove scienter as an element of a civil injunctive
action.'" Relying on the absence of specific words of intent in either
provision, 123 the dissent argued that the operative terms of section 17(a)(1) and
section 10(b) admit an interpretation, in the context of Commission injunctive
actions, that reaches deceptive practices whether scienter is present or not.' 24
The dissent also criticized the Court's failure to harmonize the antifraud pro-
visions at issue with the prevailing equity practice at the time the securities laws
were enacted.'25 That practice was not to require proof of scienter in actions
seeking equitable relief against fraudulent practices. 126 Justice Blackmun further
argued that the Court's reliance on Hochfelder was misplaced, since the structural
and policy considerations"' advanced in support of a scienter requirement for
private damage actions have no application to Commission statutory injunc-
tions.' 28 The dissent also stressed that the majority decision would upset the
statutory scheme of civil remedies that may be pursued by the Commission.' 29
II. A CRITIQUE OF THE AARON OPINION
Aaron evinces a narrow and literal construction of statutes that were once
deemed broad and remedial.' 3 ° The decision is significant in several respects.
The most important consequence of Aaron is that it circumscribes the Commis-
sion's ability to enjoin deceptive conduct. By limiting the prohibitions of section
10(b) and section 17(a)(1) to conduct involving scienter, the Court not only con-
stricts the range of deceptive conduct that is unlawful, but also erects a more
difficult burden of proof for the Commission than would obtain under a
negligence standard. Whereas proving negligence involves merely an objective
tional wrongdoing evident in a defendant's past conduct." Id. at 701 (citation omitted).
Moreover, even where a defendant is presently violating the securities laws, the Court observed
that a district court may properly consider scienter or lack of it as an aggravating or mitigating
factor in deciding whether to grant injunctive relief. Id. at 701.
122 Id. at 703-04 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Bren-
nan and Marshall, concurred in the Court's judgment that 55 17(a)(2) and (3) of the 1933 Act do
not require proof of scienter when enforced by Commission injunctions. Id. at 703.
1" Id. at 706. The dissent stressed that when Congress wanted to specify a prerequisite
of knowledge or intent for violations of the securities laws it had done so by employing the word
"willfully." Id. The dissent found the omission of this term in 5 10(b) and 5 17(a)(1) particularly
significant in light of the legislative history of 5 17(a). Congress had considered and rejected the use
of specific words of intent — "willfully" and "with the intent to defraud" — in enacting 5 17(a).
Id. at 706 n.l.
121 Id. at 707.
1" Id. at 709-12.
126 Id. at 709.
127 Id, at 713 n.4. The dissent stated, "[n]or is there any danger that actions for prophyl-
actic relief brought by the Commission will result in the 'broadening of the class of plaintiff who
may sue in this area of the law,' [which] has been an animating concern of the Court's decisions
limiting the scope of private damage actions under 5 10(b)." Id. See Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214
n.33.
128
 446 U.S. at 713.
129 Id. at 713-15.
13° Id. at 715.
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inquiry regarding whether the defendant exercised reasonable care, proving
scienter requires a problematical inquiry into the defendant's subjective state of
mind. The decision also appears virtually to eviscerate the doctrine of equitable
fraud in the context of the federal securities laws,' 3' thus eliminating the
dichotomy between SEC enforcement actions and private damage actions. The
decision may also portend a shift in the Court's view of the nature of injunctive
relief. In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger characterized an injunc-
tion as a "drastic remedy . . . not [to] be obtained against one acting in good
faith."'" Prior Supreme Court opinions, in contrast, had described the remedy
as a "mild prophylactic." ' 33 Finally, the decision reveals that the Supreme
Court apparently now views the securities laws as unambiguous on their face.
Prior to Aaron, the meaning of section 10(b) and section 17(a) had engendered
much disagreement among courts and commentators. The Supreme Court,
however, was able to ascertain the "plain meaning" of those provisions by
reference to Webster's dictionary. 134 Such a reading allows decisionmaking
without reference to the remedial purposes of the securities statutes, or other
considerations of public policy.
The following analysis will critically evaluate the Aaron Court's resolution
of the issue of scienter under section 10(b). An analysis of the Court's ruling on
section 17(a) of the 1933 Act is beyond the scope of this casenote. The Court's
reliance on Hochfelder will be tested for its merit, as will the conclusion of the
Hochfelder Court that scienter is mandated by the language and legislative history
of section 10(b). After the ambiguity of the text and legislative history of that
section has been revealed, other sources for ascertaining the provision's import
will be surveyed. An examination of the requirements for relief from fruad
under the common law, the legislative policy and statutory scheme of the 1934
Act and the legislative history of amendments to the 1934 Act will indicate that a
scienter requirement is inappropriate in the context of SEC injunctive relief
under section 10(b).
A. The Language and Legislative History of Section 10(b)
To determine whether scienter is required for a violation of section 10(b),
the Aaron Court stated that although the issue before it was expressly reserved in
" 1 Until 1975, the Court's first principle of statutory construction in the securities law
area was that "Congress intended securities legislation enacted for the purpose of avoiding frauds
to be construed not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes."
See, e.g. , Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972); Superintendent of Ins.
v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375
U.S. 180, 195 (1963). See also SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-51 (1943).
Recent decisions of the Supreme Court, however, have retreated from this principle, emphasizing
instead that the starting point in any analysis of the securities laws must be the language of the
statute. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226 (1980); Transamerica Mortgage
Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. II, 15-16 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S.
560, 568 (1979); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 558 (1979); Santa Fe
Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,
197 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
132
 446 U.S. at 703 (Burger, C. J., concurring).
133 See, e.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 193 (1963).
14 See text and notes at note 156 infra.
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Hochfelder,' 35 it would nevertheless be guided by the reasoning at that decision . 136
In its review of the various grounds for the conclusion in Hochfelder that an
allegation of scienter is required to state a private cause of action for damages
under section 10(b), the Aaron Court deemed the strongest basis for that
conclusion to be the "plain meaning" of the language of section 10(b). 137 That
section makes it unlawful to use or employ any "manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance" in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.'"
The Aaron Court summed up the position of the Hochfelder Court by asserting:
"[i]t was the view of the Court [in Hochfelder] that the terms 'manipulative,'
`device,' and 'contrivance' — whether given their commonly accepted meaning
or read as terms of art — quite clearly evinced a congressional intent to proscribe
only 'knowing or intentional misconduct.' " "9
Although the Court in Hochfelder did maintain that the language of section
10(b) was unambiguous in the context of a private suit for damages,'" Aaron,
nevertheless, seems to have exaggerated the strength of Hochfelder' s textual
analysis of that provision. Aaron read Hochfelder as stating that the language of
section 10(b) "clearly evinced a congressional intent to proscribe only knowing
or intentional misconduct." 141 The relevant passage in Hochfelder, however,
stated only that the operative terms of that section "strongly suggest . .. [sec-
tion 10(b)) was intended to proscribe knowing or intentional misconduct. '142
Elsewhere in the Hochfelder opinion the Court was even less bold when it averred
that the terms "device" and "contrivance" referred to conduct "quite different
from negligence "43 To say statutory language "strongly suggests" congres-
sional intent is not as emphatic as saying that such language "clearly evinces"
congressional intent. Similarly, conduct "different than negligence" is not
necessarily "knowing or intentional misconduct."
In addition to overstating the conclusion Hochfelder drew from its analysis of
section 10(b), Aaron also appears to have exaggerated the depth of Hochfelder' s
textual analysis of that provision. Aaron implied that the Hochfelder opinion read
the terms "manipulative," "device," and "contrivance" as "terms of -In" as
well as for their "commonly accepted meanings. 144 In fact, Hochfelder
construed only the term "manipulative" as a term of art. 145 The terms "device"
and "contrivance" were construed not as terms of art, but solely by reference to
their "commonly accepted meanings.' "" It is evident, therefore, that Aaron
136 446 U.S. at 689-90. See 425 U.S. at 193 n.12.
136 446 U.S. at 690.
137 Id .
' 39 See note 11 supra for the text of section 10(b).
139 446 U.S. at 690.
' 4° 425 U.S. at 200-01. See text and notes at notes 144-46 infra.
141 446 U.S. at 690.
142 425 U.S. at 197.
143 Id. at 199.
' 44 446 U.S. at 690. The connotations of "deceptive" were not even addressed by the
Hochfelder Court. See 425 U.S. at 199.
145 425 U.S. at 199. The Hochfelder Court merely asserted that "manipulative" "is and
was virtually a term of art when used in connection with securities markets." Id. The Court did
not state its reasoning in reaching this conclusion. Id.
146 Id. at 199 & n.20. The Hochfelder Court merely stated its conclusion that the terms
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attempted to re-shape the contours of the Hochfelder opinion. Aaron made
Hochfelder' s analysis of the language of section 10(b) appear more forceful and
more convincing that it really was.
The Aaron Court also failed to appreciate the limited circumstances under
which Hochfelder concluded that the statutory language required proof of
scienter. Hochfelder stated only that the language of section 10(b) was clear in the
context of private damage actions . 147
 It specifically reserved the issue whether
proof of scienter was required in the context of Commission injunctive actions
under section 10(b). 148
 The Court evidently believed that a different analysis
would apply to Commission suits for injunctive relief. 149 Aaron, however, appro-
priated Hochfelder' s textual analysis of section 10(b) and applied that analysis
without reservation to Commission injunctive actions under the same section. 15°
The Court's insensitivity to the limited context in which Hochfelder examined the
text of section 10(b) enabled Aaron to apply the reasoning of Hochfelder beyond its
intended scope.
The structure of the Hochfelder opinion casts further doubt on the
precedential value of that decision to the issue before the Aaron Court. The Aaron
Court asserted that the language of the statute was sufficient grounds, standing
alone, to support the conclusion in Hochfelder that scienter is required in private
damage actions under section 10(b). 15 ' The relevant passage of the Hochfelder
opinion, however, suggests the Court was not prepared to base its conclusion
solely on the statutory text. 152 The Hochfelder Court found the connotations of
scienter in the text of section 10(b) sufficiently compelling to suggest that its
textual analysis alone might justify its reading of that section.'" The Court
nevertheless elected to offer a broader justification for its holding in the structure
"manipulative," "device," and "contrivance" referred to conduct "quite different from negli-
gence," and then in a footnote laid out Webster's definitions of "device," "contrivance" and
"contrive." Id.
' 47
 Id. at 200-01. At the conclusion of its discussion of the language of
	 10(b), the
Hochfelder Court made clear that it was speaking only of "judicially implied liability." Id. at 200.
It then continued, "mindful that the language of a statute controls when sufficiently clear in its
context, further inquiry may be unnecessary." Id. at 201 (citations omitted). The Court had not
yet discussed the legislative history of 5 10(b) and the statutory scheme of express civil liability.
Thus, the Court could not have been saying that the language of 10(b) was clear in the context
of the legislative history or the statutory scheme. Accordingly, the only "context" in which the
text of 5 10(b) could be "clear" would be in the context of private damage actions, as opposed to
Commission injunctive actions and criminal actions brought by Justice Department to enforce
5 10(b).
1 " 425 U.S. at 193 n.12.
19 Id. After stating that it would not "consider the question whether scienter is a neces-
sary element in an action for injunctive relief under 10(b)," the Hochfelder Court then cited to
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau. The Court in Capital Gains insisted that proof of scienter was
not required in suits for equitable relief, 375 U.S. at 193, and characterized an injunction as equi-
table in nature. Id. at 192-93.
1 " 446 U.S. at 691. "Two of the three factors relied upon in Hochfelder — the language of
5 10(b) and its legislative history — are applicable whenever a violation of 5 10(b) . . . is alleged,
whether in a private cause of action for damages or in a Commission injunctive action under
5 21(d)." Id.
' 3 ' Id. at n.9.
'" 425 U.S. at 201.
153 Id.
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of the civil liability provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts . 154 Hochfelder' s readiness
to find other grounds for its holding suggests the Court was not as confident in
the plain meaning of section 10(b) as was the Aaron Court. It also suggests that
Hochfelder stood on two legs rather than one.
The Aaron Court, however, concluded that Hochfelder's concern for the
statutory scheme was mere surplasage, and the holding of Hochfelder could easily
be supported by the single leg of textual analysis. In order to augment this single
support and employ it to support its own conclusion, the Aaron Court overstated
the strength of Hochfelder's textual analysis of section 10(b) and glossed over the
limited context in which it was conducted. In this fashion, Aaron hammered
Hochfelder into a shape that justified its holding that the Commission must prove
scienter under section 10(b).
Despite the Aaron Court's conviction that the prohibition against "manip-
ulative or deceptive devices or contrivances" in section 10(b) is clear in any con-
text, the text of that provision is in some respects ambiguous. Since the proscrip-
tions of section 10(b) are phrased in the disjunctive, each operative term must be
given its separate meaning. 155 Thus, while the common meaning of "device or
contrivance" suggests conduct that was planned or contemplated, it does not
require intentionally deceptive conduct.' 56
 Moreover, the word "device" has
been construed by the Supreme Court and Congress to encompass conduct not
involving scienter. Although scienter traditionally has been an element of
common law fraud, the Supreme Court has held that "a device need not be
necessarily fraudulent." 157 Furthermore, the prohibition of "any manipulative,
deceptive, or other fraudulent device or contrivance," contained in section
15(c)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act' 55 has been construed by the SEC, with
express congressional approval, to encompass negligent conduct as well as
intentional fraud." 9 In addition, the Senate Committee Report of the 1934 Act
used "device" synonymously with "practice" in describing the "devices"
forbidden by section 10(b). 160 The word "practice" denotes an "action" or
154 425 U.S. at 206-11.
188
 446 U.S. at 707 (Blackmun, J., dissenting),
"8 "Device" has been defined as "[t]hat which is devised, or formed by design; a con-
trivance; an invention; project; scheme; often, a scheme to deceive; a strategm; an artifice."
WEBSTER'S INTERNATIONAL. DICTIONARY 713 (2d ed. 1934). "Contrivance" has been defined as
an "[a]ct or faculty of contriving; maneuvering; invention or inventive ability." Id. at 580.
157 Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U.S. 56, 71 (1908). In construing the
prohibition in the Elkins Act, 32 Stat. 847, 49 U.S.C. 5 41(1) (1970), of all "devices" to obtain
rebates or preferences, the Supreme Court stated, " [h]ad it been the intention of Congress to limit
• . , fraudulent schemes or devices . . . to those operating only by dishonest, underhanded
methods, it would have been easy to have so provided in words that would he unmistakable in their
meaning. A device need not necessarily be fraudulent." 209 U.S. at 71.
158 15 U.S.C. S 78o(c)(1) (1976).
159 In 1937, pursuant to its rulemaking power under 5 15(c)(1) of the 1934 Act, the
Commission provided by rule that 5 15(c)(1) made unlawful "any act, practice, or course of busi-
ness which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit." 17 C.F. R. 240.15c1-2. In 1938, while
amending 5 15(c), Congress considered and expressly approved the Commission's rule, H.R.
REP. NO. 2307, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 10 (1938); S. REP. NO. 1455, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 4, 10
(1938); Regulation of Over-the-Counter Markets: Hearings on S. 3255, H.R. 9634 Before a Subcomm, of the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 13-14, 84-86 (1938).
16° See J. REP. NO. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1934).
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"deed" and does not imply intentional wrongdoing.'" Thus, it'is not clear that
the terms "device" and "contrivance" incorporate a scienter requirement. The
adjectives "manipulative" and "deceptive," which modify the nouns "device"
and "contrivance," however, may reveal more clearly what kind of conduct is
proscribed. The word "manipulative" does connote scienter. 162 "Deceptive,"
in contrast, is generally recognized to refer to the misleading effect of a practice,
rather than the actor's state of mind. The word suggests no requirement of
scienter.'63
The above analysis indicates that the disjunctive prohibitions of section
10(b) refer to dissimilar kinds of conduct, with varied levels of scienter. While a
"manipulative contrivance" very arguably connotes conduct involving
scienter, a "deceptive device" has potentially neutral connotations, and could
refer to entirely innocent acts. The Court in Aaron and Hochfelder, however, read
the disjunctive proscriptions of section 10(b) together to establish a uniform
scienter requirement under that provision. This approach differs sharply from
the Aaron Court's analysis of section 17(a) of the 1933 Act. There the Court
refused to adopt a uniform culpability standard under the three subparagraphs
of that provision beacuse "the language of the section is not amenable to such an
interpretation."'" The Court took pains to note that "each subparagraph of
17(a) proscribes a distinct category of misconduct.'" 65 This reasoning would
seem equally applicable to the varied prohibitions of section 10(b). Having taken
such care in separating the prohibitions of section 17(a), it was inconsistent for
the Court not to have distinguished a "deceptive device" from a "manipulative
contrivance."
Of course, the Court's failure to analyze the text of sections 10(b) and 17(a)
in a similar fashion may be explained by the different manner in which the two
statutes were drafted. The prohibitions of section 17(a) are laid out in discrete
subparagraphs, 166
 while those of section 10(b) are grouped together in one
phrase.' 6 ' When taken together, however, the prohibitions of section 10(b) can-
not fairly be accorded a uniform scienter standard. To read the prohibitions
together requires acknowledging their collective ambiguity. Indeed, it is doubt-
ful that Congress intended to incorporate any specific standard of culpability
under section 10(b). In the express liability provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts,
16! See WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1937 (1933).
162 " Manipulate" was defined in 1934 as "[t]o treat or manage with the mind or intellect.
To control the action of, by management; as, to manipulate a convention; also, to manage or treat
artfully or fraudulently; as, to manipulate accounts, or election returns." WEBSTER'S
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1496 (2d ed. 1934).
'" See, e.g., Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks, 129 F. Supp. 928, 934 (D.D.C. 1955) (construing
"deceptive" in a federal trademark statute as not requiring a showing of scienter, only a showing
of a material misrepresentation reasonably relied upon by purchaser); People v. Wahl, 3 Cal.
App. Supp. 196, 197, 100 P.2d 550, 551(1940) (construing "deceptive" in a state false-advertising
statute as "not always implying] intent to deceive." See also Sonde & Freedman, "Seagulls on the
Water — Some Ships in a Storm": A Comment on Lanza v. Drexel, 49 N.Y. U. L. REV. 270, 290 (1974)
(focusing on the effect-oriented connotations of "deceptive").
' 64 446 U.S. at 697.
L65 Id.
166 See note 14 supra for the text of $ 17(a).
167
 See note 11 supra for the text of $ 10(b).
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Congress used expressions such as "reasonable ground to believe,' " 68 "for the
purpose,' "69 "had no knowledge," " 0 and "knew""' to describe conscious or
intentional wrongdoing. A negligence standard was imposed through such
phrases as "reasonable care "" 2 and "reasonable investigation."'" Congress
never employed the terms "manipulative" or "deceptive" when establishing
culpability standards under a statute providing for express civil liability.
In spite of the latent ambiguity of the operative terms of the statute and
scant evidence of Congressional intent in drafting the provision, the Aaron Court
was content to resolve the issue of scienter under section 10(b) by relying on a
prior case which had ascertained the meaning of that provision primarily by ref-
erence to the dictionary definitions of its terms. 14 A more appropriate approach
to resolving the issue would be to frankly acknowledge the ambiguity of the
phrase "manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" and proceed to
determine the appropriateness of a scienter requirement by an examination of
legislative history, the common law requirements for relief from fraud, and the
legislative policy and statutory scheme of the 1934 Act.
Despite its asserted confidence in the plain meaning of section 10(b), the
Court in Hochfelder found broader justification of its holding in the legislative
history of that section ."5 The Court remarked that the extensive hearings
preceding the passage of the 1934 Act "touched only briefly on 5 10." 176 Never-
theless, it emphasized as "Nile most relevant exposition of the provision that
was to become 5 10(b)" a statement by a spokesman for the drafters, Thomas G.
Corcoran."' Corcoran had described the provision's function as a "catch-all
clause to prevent manipulative devices." 18 The Court found it "difficult to
believe" that any legislative draftsman would use those words to describe a
provision intended to prohibit merely negligent conduct.'" In addition,
although the committee reports had not directly considered the scope of section
10(b), the Court found their discussion of specific manipulative practices
proscribed by other sections of the 1934 Act to indicate an overall congressional
intent to attach civil liability only to intentional conduct.'" While aware of the
inadequacy of the historical evidence, the Court in Hochfelder was satisfied that
'" See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 5 9(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. S 78i(a)(4) (1976).
"9 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 5 9(a)(1), (2), (4), (6), 15 U.S.C. 5 78(a)(1),
(2), (4), (6) (1976).
17° See Securities Act of 1933, 5 15, 15 U.S.C. 5 77o (1976). Congress used the negative
construction "had no knowledge" in section 15 to provide that controlling persons will be jointly
liable with those they control unless such controlling person had no knowledge" of the facts on
which the alleged liability of the controlling person is based. Id.
"i See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 5 9(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. 5 78i(a)(4) (1976).
"2 See Securities Act of 1933, 5 12(2), 15 U.S.C. 5 771(2) (1976).
173 See Securities Act of 1933, 5 11(b)(3)(B), 15 U.S.C. 5 77k(b)(3)(B) (1976).
"4 446 U.S. at 689-95.
425 U.S. at 201-06.
"6 Id. at 202.
" 7 Id.
18 Id. (quoting Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the House Comm. on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934)).
in 425 U.S. at 203.
'8° Id. at 205.
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" [t]here is no indication ... that 5 10(b) was intended to proscribe conduct not
involving scienter. ,>181
The legislative history of section 10(b), discussed by the Court in Hochfelder
and Aaron and acknowledged to be ambiguous,' 82 offers no independent support
for a scienter requirement under that provision. Rather, the Hochfelder reasoning
followed in Aaron, was that the language of section 10(b) raised a presumption of
a scienter requirement, which the meager historical evidence of congressional
intent failed to rebut.'" Only in this limited context was the Court able to say
that "history support[s] our conclusion that 5 10(b) was addressed to practices
involving some element of scienter." ' 81
 The validity of even this limited conclu-
sion, however, is debatable because the hearings and reports cited in Hochfelder
and Aaron as indirect support for a scienter requirement under section 10(b)
referred to earlier drafts of section 10(b) that did not contain the term
"deceptive."'" Since "deceptive" has a broader meaning than
"manipulative," ' 88
 reliance on these reports would seem unfounded.
The Aaron Court appeared to recognize the inadequacy of legislative history
as independent support for its holding when it insisted that "the language of the
statute . . was sufficient, standing alone, to support the [Hochfelder] Court's
conclusion that scienter is required in a private damage action under 5 10(b).
The Aaron Court's reasoning thus amounted to the mere assertion that
Hochfelder' s confidence in the plain meaning of the language of section 10(b)
should apply with equal force to SEC injunctive suits under that provision 2 88
The foregoing analysis has demonstrated the inadequacy of Aaron's reason-
ing. Neither the language nor the legislative history of section 10(b) clearly
reveal what state of mind requirement Congress intended for injunctive actions
under that provision. Accordingly, an analysis of the meaning of section 10(b) in
the context of injunctive relief should properly have focused on the common law
setting for the securities laws, the statutory scheme, administrative interpreta-
tion, and policy considerations.'"
181 Id. at 202.
182 See 446 U.S. at 690; 425 U.S. at 201, 202.
'" In Hochfelder, after analyzing the language of 5 10(b), which the Court found "strongly
suggest[ed] that 5 10(6) was intended to proscribe knowing or intentional misconduct," 425 U.S.
at 197, the Court stated that "further inquiry may be unnecessary." Id. at 201. The Court
examined the legislative history not to provide additional support for its textual analysis, but only
"to ascertain whether there is support for the meaning attributed to 5 10(b) by the Commission [in
its amicus curiae brief] and respondents." Id. (both argued for a negligence standard under 5 10(b)).
'" Id. at 201.
187
 The Court relied on a statement by Thomas G. Corcoran, a spokesman for the
drafters of the provision that was to become section 10(b), to determine the scope of that provision.
Id. at 202. The statement, however, concerned H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1934), drafts of 5 10(b) that lacked the term "deceptive." Similarly, the Senate Report, S. REP,
NO. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), also relied upon by the Court to establish the scope of 5 10(b)
analyzed S. 3420, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), a draft of 5 10(b) that also did not contain the term
"deceptive." See Note, The Scienler Requirement in SEC Injunctive Enforcement of Section 10(b) After Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 77 Cohum. L. REV 419, 426 & n.46 (1977).
186 See text and note at note 163 supra.
187 446 U.S. at 691 n.9.
199 Id. at 691.
189 The Supreme Court followed a similar approach in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). The Blue Chip Court rejected a restrictive analysis, akin to that
''18 7
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B. The Applicability of the Doctrine of Equitable Fraud to SEC Injunctive Actions
After concluding that Hochfelder required proof of scienter in Commission
injunctive actions under section 10(b), the Court in Aaron then rejected the
relevance of SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureaul" to the instant case. 19 ' This
rejection of Capital Gains ignored the significance of the common law setting in
which the securities laws were enacted. Capital Gains presented the issue whether
the SEC is required to establish scienter to enjoin deceptive conduct proscribed
by section 206(2) of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940) 92 The Court held that
proof of scienter was not required, grounding its conclusion on evidence of
legislative intent,'" the requirements for relief from fraud under the common
law,'" and the practical effect of a scienter requirement on achieving the
purposes of the legislation.'" Although the legislative history of section 206(2)
offered adequate grounds for its holding,' 96 the Court nevertheless analyzed the
implications of the common law tradition where the requirements for relief from
fraud vary with the nature of the transaction, the relationship of the parties, and
the type of relief requested.' 97 It stressed that in a suit for equitable relief, proof
of scienter was generally not required.'" Unwilling to assume Congress was not
aware of these developments in the common law, the Court in Capital Gains
suggested that the legislation had incorporated these flexible standards for
relief. 199
The Aaron Court distinguished Capital Gains on the grounds that the
language and legislative history of section 206(2) did not support a scienter
requirement, 2" and that the provision 'regulated a fiduciary relationship,
wherein "intent to defraud would not have been required even in a common-
law action for money damages." 261 While these observations may have under-
cut the precedential value of Capital Gains in the context of Commission injunc-
employed in Hothfelder and Aaron, which would rely primarily on linguistic analysis and historical
evidence. We would by no means be understood as suggesting that we are able to devine from the
language of $ 10(b) the express 'intent of Congress' as to the contours of a private cause of action
under rule 10b-5." Id. at 737. With regard to the proper weight to be accorded historical evidence
of legislative intent, the Court stated:
Mt would be disingenuous to suggest that either Congress in 1934 or the Securities and
Exchange Commission in 1942 foreordained the present state of the law with respect to
Rule 10b-5. It is therefore proper that we consider, in addition to the factors already
discussed, what may be described as policy considerations when we come to flesh out
the portions of the law with respect to which neither the congressional enactment nor
the administrative regulations offer conclusive guidance.
Id.
190 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
446 U.S. at 691-95.
192 375 U.S. at 185-86. See note 87 supra for the text of 5 206(2) and the type of conduct
("scalping") sought to be enjoined.
' 93 375 U.S. at 186-92.
194 Id. at 192-95.
'" Id. at 200-01.
'" Id. at 192.
' 97 Id. at 193,
' 98 Id. See note 92 supra.
199 Id. at 195.
200 446 U.S. at 694.
201 Id.
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tive actions under section 10(b), they do not weaken the relevance of the com-
mon law tradition on which the Court in Capital Gains relied. It is submitted that
this common law tradition along with congressional reliance on state
predecessors to the federal securities laws is persuasive evidence that Congress
intended the SEC to have equitable enforcement power under section 10(b)
absent a showing of scienter.
1. The Common Law Background
When Congress enacted the federal securities laws, the common law
provided a two-tier system of remedies for misrepresentation. Although actions
brought to recover damages for misrepresentation required proof of scienter, 202
equity provided relief"3
 for defrauded plaintiffs without requiring proof of
scienter. 264
 The different nature of the remedies accounted for this two-tier
scheme. legal remedies for fraud "center about redress, vindication, punish-
ment, [and] restitution." 205
 Consequently, courts required a showing of fault
before legal remedies could be invoked. Equitable remedies, in contrast, seek to
prevent or minimize injury, rather than punish a defendant for his state of mind.
"It is not the cause but the fact, of injury, and the problem of its practical control
. . . which concern the [equity] court." 206 Further, equitable remedies subjected
the defendant to less harm than an action for darnages. 207 The lower culpability
standard for equitable actions thus permitted effective control of fraudulent
conduct and at the same time avoided unfairness to defendants. The Court in
Capital Gains demonstrated a proper concern for harmonizing the requirements
for injunctive relief under the federal securities laws with the requirements for
equitable relief at common law. Absent clear historical evidence, it should not be
presumed that Congress in enacting the 1933 and 1934 Acts intended to depart
from the common law tradition. 208
 Rather, it would be more reasonable to
conclude that Congress, consistent with this tradition, intended a two-tier
202 See, e.g., Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337, 374 (1889) (Lord Herschel) holding, in a
securities fraud context, that a private damage action based on negligent misrepresentations
would not lie). See also 3 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS 5 525-526 (1938); F. HARPER, THE LAW OF
TORTS 5 76 (1933).
'°' Recission of the transaction was the primary equitable remedy for misrepresentation.
See generally Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 YALE L. J. 227, 231-32 (1933).
204 See, e.g Bloomquist v. Farson, 222 N.Y. 375, 380, 118 N.E. 855, 856 (1918); 2 J.
PomERoy, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 5 885 (4th ed. 1918).
2 ° 5
 F. LAWRENCE, SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 13 (1929).
206 Id.
2" The primary equitable remedy for misrepresentation was recission of the transaction.
This remedy merely restored the parties to the status quo before the sale. Thus, "it does not seem
that a liability for loss is imposed upon the seller, or that money is being taken from his pocket to
compensate the buyer." Schulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 YALE L. J. 227, 231
(1933). In contrast to the comparative mildness of an equitable action for recission, an action at
law for deceit carried with it the potential of draconian liability. Also, the charge of deceit was
considered to be in effect an accusation of thievery, and considerable social opprobrium attached
to a determination of liability. Id. at 233.
2" The Court in Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 (1944), adopted this exact reasoning:
"It is therefore even more compelling to conclude that, if Congress desired to make such an abrupt
departure from traditional equity practice as is suggested, it would have made its desire plain." Id.
at 330.
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standard for relief under section 10(b), with proof of scienter required in a
private suit for damages, but not in an equitable injunctive action.
2. Congressional Reliance on State Blue Sky Statutes
The significance of this common law tradition of broad equitable relief
against fraud is buttressed by reference to state precursors of the federal
securities laws. Prior to the passage of the federal securities laws, many states
had attempted to deal with the problem of securities fraud by enacting their own
"blue sky" statutes. One variety of these state statutes empowered gov-
ernmental authorities to enjoin fraudulent practices in the sale of securities. 209
Congress, in seeking to provide federal securites regulation explicitly drew from
the experience of the states. 21° Conspicuous among these state statutes was New
York's Martin Act,'" which had been actively enforced."' Congress used the
Martin Act as one of its principal models in drafting the Securities Act of 1933. 213
It is not surprising, therefore, that the Martin Act's anti-fraud provisions closely
resembled section 17(a)(1) and (3) of the 1933 Act,'" and the Martin Act's
provision authorizing government injunctive actions was almost identical to sec-
tion 20(b) of the 1933 Act.'" The New York statute was also cited during the
congressional debates to explain the injunctive provisions under the 1934 Act. 216
In light of Congress's reliance on the Martin Act in drafting those provisions
under consideration by the Aaron Court, the judicial construction of the Martin
Act by the New York courts would appear to be highly relevant in ascertaining a
congressional intent to impose a scienter requirement under section 17(a) and
section 10(b). In this regard, it is significant that the New York Court of Appeals
in People v. Federated Radio Corp. 217 held that securities fraud could be enjoined in
equity under the statute without proof of scienter. 218 Further, the Nei,/ York
209 See 1 L. LOSS, supra note 6, at 30-32, 35-43 (1961); L. Loss & E. Cowerr, BLUE
SKY LAW at 17-26 (1958).
210 446 U.S. at 711 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
211 1921 N.Y. Laws c. 649 55 352-353.
212
	 McCall, Comments on the Martin Act, 3 BROOKLYN L. REV. 190, 203 (1934) (2,682
individuals and corporations enjoined between 1931 and 1933).
213
	
U.S. at 711 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Federal Securities Act, Hearings on
H.R. 4314 before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 11, 95,
109, 112 (1933); Securities Act: Hearings on S. 875 before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess., 71, 146, 147, 156, 170, 245-46, 253. See generally 1 Loss, supra note 6, at 33-34,
35-43.
214. Compare 1921 N.Y. Laws c. 649 5 352 with 17(a)(1) and (3) of the Securities Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C. 5 77q(a)(1) and (3) (1976).
215
 Compare 1921 N.Y. Laws c. 649 353 with 5 20(b) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C.
5 77t(b) (1976).
218
	 78 CoNG. REC. 8096 (1934) (remark of Rep. Black).
217 244 N.Y. 33, 154 N.E. 655 (1926).
21e
	
at 38-39, 41, 154 N.E. at 657, 658. Professor Loss described Federated Radio as "one
of the leading cases on the concept of fraud in securities legislation, state or federal." 1 Loss, .supra
note 4, at 41 n.78.
Federated Radio's holding that proof of scienter was not required in injunctive proceedings to
enjoin securities fraud was repeatedly upheld by the New York courts. See, e.g. , People v. Rice, 221
App. Div. 443, 447-48, 223 N.Y.S. 566, 570-71 (1927); People v. New York City Air Port, Inc.,
143 Misc. 472, 473, 256 N.Y.S. 89, 90-91 (1931).
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decision "was in keeping with the general tenor of state laws governing
equitable relief in the context of securities transactions. " 219
Although the Aaron Court was aware that Congress had relied on the
Martin Act to the extent of incorporating some of its language into the 1933 and
1934 Acts, it dismissed the significance of the New York Court's construction of
the statute because there was no evidence that the holding of Federated Radio was
specifically called to Congress's attention . 22 ° It seems unwarranted, however, to
demand proof of congressional cognizance of a particular holding in this con-
text. If Congress went so far as to adopt the language of the Martin Act, it seems
that it would have also been aware of the construction given its important provi-
sions by the highest New York Court. Moreover, Federated Radio was not an
isolated holding."' Rather, it was part of an established and longstanding equity
tradition. 222
 If Congress had intended to depart from this tradition in enacting
the securities laws, it would have left more evidence of that intention than the
Aaron Court was able to find.
C . Harmonizing the State of Mind Requirement Under Section 10(b)
with the Statutory Array of SEC Remedies
In addition to its failure to harmonize statutory construction with
prevailing equity practice at the time the securities laws were enacted, the Aaron
Court also failed to consider the impact of its holding on the carefuly balanced
statutory array of SEC enforcement remedies. In this respect, the Court
departed from the reasoning of Hochfelder. Indeed, perhaps the strongest support
for the Court's reading of section 10(b) in Hochfelder was its reasoning that the
scheme of civil liability in the 1933 and 1934 Acts requires proof of scienter for
the recovery of damages under that provision."' The Hochfelder Court was
concerned that extending the scope of section 10(b) to permit private damage
actions predicated on negligence would "nullify the effectiveness of the carefully
drawn procedural restrictions" on the express civil remedies in the 1933 Act
allowing recovery for negligent conduct. 224 A similar concern for the statutory
scheme should have guided the Aaron Court's construction of section 10(b). A
negligence standard for injunctive relief would entail no comparable
Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. at 712 (Blackmun, J. dissenting). Contemporary legal com-
mentary on blue sky statutes noted that injunctive relief was available without proof of defendant's
scienter. See Note, Liability for Misrepresentations in Corporate Prospectuses, 40 YALE L. J. 987, 987
(1931).
2" 446 U.S. at 700 n.18.
221 Id. at 712 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See note 218 supra.
242
	 U.S. at 712 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
22 ' 425 U.S. at 208-11.
2" Id. at 210. The Court observed that "[e]ach of the provisions of the 1934 Act that
expressly create civil liability, except those directed at specific classes of individuals such as
directors, officers, or 10% beneficial holders of securities, see 5 16(b), 15 U.S.C. 5 78p(b) . . .
contains a state-of-mind condition requiring something more than negligence." Id. at 209 n.28
(citations omitted). The Court did note, however, that "some courts have concluded that proof of
scienter is unnecessary in an action for damages [under 5 14(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C.
78n(a)] by the shareholder recipients of a materially misleading proxy statement against the issuer
corporation." 425 U.S. 209 n.28. See note 78 supra for a discussion of the procedural restrictions
on actions brought under 55 11, 12(2), and 15 of the 1933 Act.
March 19811	 CASENOTES	 621
nullification of procedural limitations in the 1933 or 1934 Act, and indeed,
would harmonize the state of mind requirements in the statutory array of SEC
remedies.
The options available to the SEC in enforcing the securities laws include
administrative sanctions, criminal referrals to the Justice Department, and
injunctive proceedings. Certain provisions of the securities laws permit the SEC
to impose administrative sanctions on persons who "willfully" violate the
statutes."' The governmental remedy may have severe consequences for the
defendant. If the SEC determines that a sanction is in the public interest, it may
revoke, suspend, or deny registration of a broker-dealer226 or investment
adviser"' or censure or limit the activity of anyone associated with a broker-
dealer."' An additional remedy consists of referring cases of willful violations to
the Justice Department with a recommendation for criminal prosecution. 229 If
the action is pursued by the Justice Department, the defendant may be subject
to both fines and imprisonment. 230 The provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts
authorizing the SEC to seek injunctive relief, however, to not impose a state of
mind requirement. Rather, section 20(b) of the 1933 Act and section 21(d) of the
1934 Act require a district court to grant injunctive relief "upon a proper
showing.""' Since Congress did not specify a state of mind requirement under
these provisions, reference to the other statutory remedies available to the
Commission and the express culpability standards thereunder is appropriate in
determining what constitutes a "proper showing" under sections 20(b) and
21(d).
Congress reserved the more severe remedies of administrative sanctions
and criminal prosecution for "willful" violations of the securities laws. Since
knowing and intentional misconduct is already subject to these punitive
remedies, a relaxed state of mind requirement for Commission injunctions,
which serve to protect rather than to punish, would harmonize the statutory
scheme. It is logical to assume that Congress intended the statutory injunction
to protect against a broader range of conduct than that which is criminal.
The overlapping coverage of section 10(b) and section 17(a) of the 1933 Act
also suggests that section 10(b) should be read to encompass more than
22 ' See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 55 8(a), 15(b)(4)(A), (D), & (E), and 15(3)(7), 15
U.S.C. 55 78h(a), o(b)(4)(A), (D), & (E) (1976); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 55 203(d)(1)
and (4), 203(f), 15 U.S.C, 55 80b-3(e)(1), (4) & (5), 806-3(f) (1976).
226 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 5 15(6)(5), 15 U.S.C. 78o(b)(4) (1976).
227 Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 5 203(d), 15 U.S.C. 80b-3(e) (1976).
228 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 5 15(6), 15 U.S.C. 5 780(6)(6) (1976).
229 e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 5 20, 15 U.S.C. 77t(b) (1976); Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 5 32, 15 U.S.C. 78ff (1976). While it is unnecessary to prove that defendant had the
specific intent to violate the law, it must be shown that defendant understood his actions and pur-
posefully performed the acts constituting the violation. See generally James, Culpability Predicates for
Federal Securities Law Sanctions; The Present Law and the Proposed Federal Securities Code, 12 HARV. J.
LEGI.S. 1 (1974).
23° See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 5 24, 15 U.S.C. 5 77x (1976) ($10,000 fine and/or
five years imprisonment); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 5 32, 15 U.S.C. S 78ff (1976) (maxi-
mum fine of $500,00 for an exchange; $10,000 fine and/or 5 years imprisonment for others).
"' Securities Act of 1933, 5 20(b), 15 U.S.C. 77t(b) (1976); Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 5 21(d), 15 U.S.C. 78u(d) (1976). See note 28 supra for text of provisions.
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intentional conduct when enforced by Commission injunctions. Section 17(a)
prohibits misrepresentations made by sellers of securities . 232 Section 10(b)
covers misrepresentations made by either a buyer or a seller. 233
 Under Aaron,
proof of scienter is required under section 17(a)(1), but not under section
17(a)(2) and (3). 234
 It appears, however, that the Court's ruling would not
diminish to any appreciable extent the power of the SEC to enjoin deceptive
practices in the offer or sale of securities. The reason for this is the overlapping
coverage of the three subparagraphs of section 17(a). 235
 Subparagraph (1)
prohibits employing "any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud" "in the offer
or sale of any securities," and requires proof of scienter to establish an
enjoinable violation . 2" Subparagraph (2) prohibits obtaining "money or
property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to
state a material fact," and, under Aaron does not require proof of scienter.""
Subparagraph (2) would appear to prohibit devices and schemes to defraud
subject to sanction under subparagraph (1) to the extent such devices to defraud
involved material misstatements or omissions for pecuniary gain. Where no
statement or omission was involved, or where no pecuniary gain resulted,
however, conduct prohibited by subparagraph (1) could not be enjoined under
subparagraph (2). What might be left of the independent coverage of
subparagraph (1), however, appears to be fully subsumed by the broad sweep of
the prohibitions of subparagraph (3), which also does not require proof of
scienter. 238
 Subparagraph (3) makes unlawful "any transaction, practice, or
course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the
purchaser." The provision, which focuses solely upon the effect of deceptive
practices upon the purchaser, does not require any material statement or
omission to be made by the offeror or seller of a security, nor does it require any
pecuniary gain to accrue to the perpetrator of the deception. Thus, both barriers
to liability under subparagraph (2) would be avoided if the SEC proceeded under
subparagraph (3). Furthermore, the prohibition of devices, schemes, or artifices
to defraud under subparagraph (1) would appear to fall entirely within the
larger class of prohibitions under subparagraph (3) of "practices" which
"operate" as a fraud or deceit. Under subparagraph (3), an actual fraud need not
be shown, but only a course of conduct which has the effect of defrauding a
purchaser. Additionally, subparagraph (3) covers any practice which has the
proscribed effect, while subparagraph (1) is limited to devices, schemes, and
artifices. The Aaron Court determined that subparagraph (1) conduct must
232 Section 17(a) applies only to misrepresentations made "in the offer or sale of any
securities." The text of 5 17(a), 15 U.S.C. 77q(a) (1976), is set out in note 14 supra.
23 ' Section 10(b) prohibits misrepresentations made "in connection with the purchase or
sale" of any security, The text of 5 10(b), 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) (1976), is set forth in note 11 supra.
The "in connection with" language has been construed to extend the ambit of 5 10(b) beyond
misrepresentations made in transactions, and has been held to cover misleading corporate
releases. See, e.g. , SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 860 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub
corn. Kline v. SEC, 394 U.S, 976 (1969).
2"
 Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. at 701-02.
236
	 note 14 supra for the text of 5 I7(a).
236
 446 U.S. at 701.
237
 Id. at 702.
239 Id.
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involve scienter. In contrast, a "practice" merely denotes an action or deed and
is not limited to intentional misconduct. 239 It would therefore appear that by
holding section 17(a)(1) to require proof of scienter, the Aaron Court did little to
restrict the Commission's power to enjoin deceptive practices in the offer or sale
of securities. The broad scope of subparagraphs (2) and (3) renders the scienter
standard under subparagraph (1) effete. Consequently, section 17(a) as a whole
is not limited by a scienter requirement.
In view of the overlapping coverage of the three subparagraphs of section
17(a), the effect of the Court's holding section 10(b) to require proof of scienter is
to disrupt the statutory scheme of the 1933 and 1934 Acts. To require proof of
scienter under section 10(b), which applies to both purchasers and sellers, but
not under section 17(a), which applies only to sellers, is to state that "henceforth
only the seller's negligent misrepresentations may be enjoined ." 24° Neither the
language of section 10(b) nor the policies of the 1933 and 1934 Acts support this
distinction. 24 ' An identical standard of liability under section 17(a) and 10(b)
would harmonize the statutory scheme.
D. Judicial Deference to Administrative Construction
Which Has Been Approved by Congress
Prior to Aaron, the SEC had long maintained that section 10(b) and rule
10b-5 did not require proof of scienter when enforced by Commission injunc-
tions. 242 As a general rule, courts defer to the construction placed on a statute by
the agency charged with its execution 243 unless that construction is "inconsistent
with a statutory mandate or [would] frustrate the congressional policy under-
lying a statute." 244 The administrative construction of a statute is accorded even
greater weight when Congress reviews and approves that construction in the
course of amending or re-enacting the statute. 245 It is submitted that the SEC's
239 See WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1937 (1933).
2" 446 U.S. at 715, (Blackmun, J., dissenting),
241 The legislative purposes of (I) providing "full and fair disclosure of the character of
securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce," H.R. REP. NO. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1
(1933); (2) banning deceptive, misleading, or fraudulent practices, S. REP. NO. 47, 73d Cong.
1st Sess. 1 (1933); (3) restoring public confidence in the securities industry, H.R. REP. NO.
1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1934); and (4) preventing the further wasting of national resources
caused by disreputable business practices, H.R. REP. NO. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1933),
are not promoted by permitting the SEC to enjoin negligent misrepresentations by sellers but not
by purchasers. See Note, Injunctive Relief in SEC Civil Actions: The Scope offraricial Discretion, 10 COL-
UM. J. L. & SOC. PROB. 328, 332-35 (1974) [hereinafter cited as COLUMBIA NOTE].
242 Brief for SEC at 53-54, Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980).
"3 See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969).
2" SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 118 (1978).
245 See, e.g., Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 57 (1979) ("it is particularly relevant that
Congress has twice reviewed and amended the statute without rejecting the Department's view");
United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 553-54 & n.10 (1979) ("once an agency's statutory
construction has been fully brought to the attention of the public and Congress, and the latter has
not sought to alter that interpretation although it has amended the statute in other respects, then
presumably the legislative intent has been correctly discerned"); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575,
580 (1978) ("Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a
statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change"); Saxbe v.
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interpretation of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 as not requiring proof of scienter
was in accord with the policies underlying the 1933 and 1934 Acts and was not
inconsistent with the statutory language of section 10(b). Furthermore,
Congress was expressly informed of the Commission's position on two occasions
when significant amendments to the securities laws were enacted. On each
occasion Congress left the administrative interpretation undisturbed.
Congress considered the requirements for Commission injunctions in the
course of passing the Securities Act Amendments of 1975. 245 The Senate report
of the bill ultimately enacted addressed the purpose and scope of Commission
injunctive remedies and noted that proof of scienter was not required in such
actions. 247 In reliance on the different purposes of Commission enforcement
proceedings and privte actions,'" Congress enacted section 21(g) of the 1934 Act
which provides that, absent consent from the Commission, private actions may
not be consolidated with Commission proceedings . 249 Prior law had provided for
consolidation of actions involving common questions of fact."° Under this pro-
cedure, private litigants frequently attempted to "ride along on the Govern-
ment's cases." 251
 The committee found that consolidation substantially delayed
the Commission's attempts to secure prompt relief from violations of the
securities laws. 252
 The report noted that one of the chief causes of delay was that
private actions raise issues, such as defendant's scienter, that need not be proven
in a Commission injunctive action. 253
Congress again reviewed the Commission's interpretation that scienter is
not required in injunctive actions when enacting the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Biistos, 419 U.S. 65, 74 (1974) ("[s]uch a history of administrative construction and congressional
acquiescence may add a gloss or qualification to what is on its face unqualified statutory
language").
2 " Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975).
27 S. REP. NO. 94-75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 76-77, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 179, 254-55.
2"
 The Senate Committee on Housing, Banking, and Urban Affairs stated:
[A]lthough both the Commission's suit for injunctive relief brought pursuant to express
statutory authority and a private action for damages fall within the general category of
civil (as distinct from criminal) proceedings, their objectives are really quite different.
Private actions for damages seek to adjudicate a private controversy between citizens;
the Commission's action for civil injunction is a vital part of the Congressionally [sic]
mandated scheme of law enforcement in the securities area. Id. at 76, reprinted in [1975]
U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS at 254.
249 15 U.S.C. § 78u(g) (1976).
2"
 28 U.S.C. § 1407, enacted by Congress in 1968, created a procedure for consolidated
or coordinated pre-trial proceedings for litigation in which two or more actions involving one or
more common questions of fact were pending in jurisdictional districts. See S. REP. NO. 94-75,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 73-76, reprinted in [197 5] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 179, 251-54, for a
discussion of the prior law and the Commission's experience with the consolidation provision.
251 S. REP. No. 94-75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 74, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 252.
252 Id. at 74, 76, 77, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 252, 254, 255.
2" Id. at 76, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 254. The Senate
report stated: "Private actions frequently will involve more parties and more issues than the
Commission's enforcement action, thus greatly increasing the need for extensive pretrial
discovery. In particular, issues related to . . scienter, causation, and the extent of damages
are elements not required to be demonstrated in a Commission injunctive action." Id. (emphasis
in original).
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Act of 1977.254 The House bill prohibited certain corrupt foreign payments by
domestic corporations."' Civil and criminal sanctions were provided, and the
SEC and the Justice Department were granted concurrent enforcement jurisdic-
tion. 256 Although criminal prosecution required proof of intent, the House bill
did not specify whether a similar burden applied to Commission injunctive pro-
ceedings. The House report, however, emphasized that it did not intend a
scienter requirement. 257 Reasoning that "an SEC enforcement action is
designed to protect the public against the recurrence of violative conduct, and
not to punish a state of mind," 258 the report expressly approved judicial
decisions holding that scienter was not required when the SEC seeks injunctive
relief under rule 10113-5. 259
The Aaron Court summarily dismissed the relevance of this congressional
endorsement of the Commission's interpretation of section 10(b) with the obser-
vation that "the legislative consideration of those statutes was addressed
principally to matters other than at issue here." 26° The Commission's interpre-
tation of section 10(b) however, was compatible with the text and purpose 26 ' of
the 1934 Act and enjoyed sufficient congressional approval to be accorded a
presumption of validity. 262 The Aaron Court ignored established principles of
judicial deference to administrative interpretation in proceeding directly to the
dictionary definition of the operative terms of section 10(b).
E. Policy Considerations
The ambiguous text and legislative history of section 10(b), the affirmation
of the distinction between fraud at law and fraud in equity in the securities laws,
and subsequent congressional approval of this two-tier scheme of culpability
standards should have convinced the Aaron Court that Hochfelder did not require
a scienter standard for Commission injunctive enforcement of section 10(b).
When analysis of statutory text and historical evidence does not clearly reveal
legislative intent, it is proper for courts to construe provisions in a manner con-
254
	 L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977).
255
	 REP. NO. 95 -640, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1977).
256 Id. at 9-10.
25]
	at 10.
258
"9 Id. The report stated:
Although the Supreme Court has held that private plaintiffs seeking to recover monetary
damages for violations of Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5 . .. must establish that
the defendant acted with scienter, the appellate courts quite properly have never required
proof of scienter in any of the Commissions's own enforcement proceedings ... [T]his
committee intends that scienter is not an element of any Commission enforcement
proceeding.
Id. (citations omitted; emphasis in original). The weight to be accorded these statements in the
House Committee Report should not be over-estimated. First, the Senate bill, S. 305, rather
than the House bill, H:R. 3815, became law. Secondly, the Conference Committee stated that
this legislation should not be converted into a debate on the important issues raised by the
Hochfelder decision." H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 95 -381, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 11, reprinted in 119771
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4121, 4123.
26° 446 U.S. at 694 n.11.
"' See note 241 supra.
261 See note 245 supra.
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sistent with the overall purposes and policies of the legislation. 263
 Indeed, the
Supreme Court has endorsed the appropriateness of policy considerations when
defining the ambit of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. 264 If the Aaron Court had
made such an inquiry into the purposes served and consequences imposed by
the statutory injunction, it is unlikely the Court would have imposed a rigid
scienter requirement on injunctive actions to enforce section 10(b).
The rationale for dispensing with proof of scienter in equitable actions at
common law lay in a concern for effective enforcement and in the assumption
that the relief granted did not impose unfair hardship on defendants. 285 A
similar approach in the context of the securities laws was adopted in Capital
Gains266
 and applied to section 10(b) by Judge Friendly in SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co. 267
 This approach applied the common law doctrine of equitable
fraud to Commission actions to enjoin fraudulent conduct. The merits of this
approach will be examined to see if a broad culpability standard for SEC injunc-
tive relief would further the policies of the securities laws while not inflicting
unreasonable harm.
The primary support for a broader culpability requirement is that it would
enable the SEC, as the "statutory guardian" of the public interest, 268 to better
protect investors. The statutory injunction is a flexible, effective, and speedy
means of enforcing compliance with the law. 269
 In addition to its primary
function of safeguarding the public interest by enjoining specific present or
future violations, an injunction also serves as an effective deterrent and a useful
tool to publicize the scope of the law through "educational litigation." 270 The
Commission relies heavily on injunctions as a means of enforcing compliance
with the securities laws."' Since the harm to investors from deceptive practices is
the same whether those practices are intentional or negligent, a relaxed
culpability standard would enable the SEC to protect against a broader range of
deceptive conduct. In addition, removing the difficult task of proving scienter
would reduce the Commission's burden of proof, thus making injunctions easier
to obtain. A negligence standard would also increase the Commission's bargain-
263 See, e.g. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
264 Id .
263
	
text and notes at notes 202-08 supra.
266 375 U.S. 180, 192-95 (1963).
267
	 F.2d 833, 866 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J., concurring). Although Judge Friendly
argued that proof of scienter should be required under 10(b) in the context of private damage
actions, id. at 866-68, he also asserted that negligence was the appropriate standard for injunctive
enforcement of 5 10(b). Id. at 868. After stating that "pit is not necessary in a suit for equitable
or prophylactic relief to establish all the elements required in a suit for money damages," id.,
Judge Friendly concluded that the public interest in effective enforcement of the securities laws
and the comparative mildness of an injunction's impact on a defendant and his legitimate ac-
tivities justified a reduced standard of liability for injunctive relief under 5 10(b). Id.
266 SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 808 (2d Cir. 1975).
269 See Note, The Statutory Injunction as an Enforcement Weapon of Federal Agencies, 57 YALE
L. J. 1023, 1025, 1048 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Yale Note].
270 Id. at 1048.
221 See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. at 704. (Blackmun, J., dissenting); SEC v. IMC Inter-
national, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 889, 894 (N.D. Tex. 1974), of 'd without opinion, 505 F.2d 733 (5th Cir.
1974), cert. denied sub nom. Evans v. SEC, 420 U.S. 930 (1975); Cf. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 195 (1976) (noting that Congress provided the Commission with "an arsenal of flexible
enforcement powers").
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ing power. Defendants would be more likely to accept consent decrees, thus
saving the SEC the time and expense of protracted litigation. Finally, injunc-
tions are perhaps "best suited for application to negligent malfeasors whose
future compliance may be stimulated by a judicial mandate." 272 Those who are
intent on violating the law are less likely to be deterred or prompted to compli-
ance by injunctions. 223 Administrative remedies or criminal prosecution may be
better means for ensuring their compliance with the law.
The different functions of Commission injunctions and private damage
actions also provide a strong policy basis for according a relaxed standard of
proof to injunction proceedings. Whereas the function of a private damage
action is to make the injured party whole, and in some instance to punish the
wrongdoer, 274 Commission actions are brought to safeguard the public interest
by enjoining present or future violations. 273 Thus, the remedial rather than
retributive nature of an injunction action supports a relaxed culpability
standard. 276 In addition, a negligence standard for SEC injunctive relief would
promote the statutory policy of preventing deception in the sale of securities.
Injunctions would be more readily obtainable and would protect against a
broader range of deceptive conduct under a negligence standard.
Despite such advantages, however, a relaxed standard of liability could
create some inequities among defendants and could potentially frustrate other
statutory policies. Under a negligence standard, innocent defendants unwilling
to undergo the expense and attendant publicity of litigation may be more likely
to enter into consent decrees. Moreover, defendants charged with negligent
violations may be subject to the same adverse consequences of an injunction or
consent decree as would more fiendish violators. In addition, the added protec-
tion afforded by a negligence standard would increase the potential for dealer
and issuer liability. The cost of increased protective measures employed by
dealers would then be passed on to the individual investor. Injunctive liability
for negligent acts might also frustrate an important purpose behind the
securities laws, the public disclosure of corporate information. 277 The spectre of
injunctive liability under section 10(b) for negligently prepared press releases
might make corporate officials hesitant to issue unnecessary public announce-
ments, thus stifling the full disclosure and exchange of information the securities
laws seek to promote. 278
272 See Yale Note, supra note 269, at 1046-47; SEC v. Spectrum Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir.
1973) (implying that a negligence standard for injunctive enforcement will encourage greater
care). But cf. SEC v. Universal Major Indus., 546 F.2d 1044, 1047 n.1 (2d Cir. 1976) (entertaining
argument that negligence is not enjoinable).
272 See SEC Civil Injunctive Actions, 30 BuS. LAW. 1303, 1327 (1975) ("If the defendant is a
real crook, he couldn't care less about those civil injunctions of the SEC." Remarks of R.
Warren).
"4 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS S t at 2, 5 2 at 9 (4th ed. 1971).
275 Set SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 201 (1963); SEC v.
Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 807 (2d Cir. 1975); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
401 F.2d 833, 868 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly,,., concurring).
274 See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S 128, 151 (1972); Superintendent
of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971).
2" See note 278 infra.
2 " See Columbia Note, supra note 241, at 364 (expressing fear that broad culpability
standard for injunctive enforcement would restrict public disclosure of corporate information);
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In addition, in spite of the remedial function of Commission injunctions,
the punitive aspects of the action often have been overlooked. 279
 In this context,
it may be questioned whether the sanction is too severe for merely negligent vio-
lations of the law and whether the increased effectiveness of enforcement actions
under a negligence standard may impose an unfair burden on defendants.
Defendants may be subject to sanctions in both the injunctive proceeding itself
and in possible subsequent judicial and administrative proceedings. In the
injunctive proceeding, even if defendant is successful in escaping liability, he
must nevertheless incur the expenses of litigation and weather the accompany-
ing publicity.'" If an injunction does issue, the direct consequence is to place the
defendant under a continuing order not to commit similar violations of the
securities laws. 28 ' Once the district court's equitable jurisdiction attaches, how-
ever, the scope of relief may be far broader than a Mere order to comply with the
law. Ancillary relief that may accompany an injunction includes: disgorgement
of profits; 282
 rescission ; 283
 appointment of a receiver, trustee, or special agent;284
special filing of informational reports; 2 " and a court ordered freeze on the
defendant's assets. 286
 In addition to these burdens imposed as part of the injunc-
tive proceeding itself, administrative sanctions may ensue. Certain rights and
exemptions under the securities laws are automatically lost when an injunction
is granted against a defendant.'" In addition, the Commission may in its discre-
tion impose additional sanctions against defendants, including disqualification
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 882 (2d Cir. 1968) (Moore, 3., dissenting), cert.
denied sub nom, Kline v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) ("If press releases have to read like
prospectuses to guard against possible 10b-3 liability, it is safe to predict that they will quickly fall
out of favor with corporate management"). Cf. Note, Scicnter and Rule 10b-5, 69 COLUM. L. REV.
1057, 1081-82 (1969) (expressing similar concern in context of private damage actions). It has also
been suggested that the issuance of a larger number of injunctions under a relaxed culpability
standard would undermine the policy of the securities laws of maintaining public confidence in the
securities markets, SEC Civil Injunctive Actions, 30 BUS. LAW. 1303, 1317 (1975), and would
decrease the deterrent effect of injunctions as the "stigma" of liability decreased. See YALE NOTE,
supra note 269, at 1044-45.
2"
 A negligence standard for the issuance of Commission injunctions has often been
justified on the grounds that it is but a "mild prophylactic." See, e.g., SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 193 (1963).
u° Both the institution of a suit and its final determination are publicly reported. The
defendant thus receives a "double blast" of adverse publicity. See COLUMBIA NOTE, supra note
241, at 342.
"' See Matthews, SEC Civil Injunctive Actions, 5 REV. SEC. REC. 969, 969-70 (1972)
282 See, e.g., SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301, 1309 (2d Cir. 1974); SEC v. Manor
Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1104 (2d Cir. 1972).
"' See, e.g., Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 390.91 (2d
Cir.) cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
26•
	
e.g., SEC v. Bull Inv. Group, Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder' FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 1 95,010, at 97,522 (D. Mass. 1975); see also SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc.,
458 F.2d 1082, 1105 (2d Cir. 1972).
265
	 SEC v. Radio Hill Mines Co., 479 F.2d 4, 6-7 (2d Cir. 1973); SEC v. R. J.
Allen & Assocs., 386 F. Supp. 866, 880 (S.D. Fla. 1974).
"' See, e.g., SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1105-06 (2d Cir.
1972); SEC v. Scott, Gorman Muns., Inc., 407 F. Supp. 1383, 1388 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
287 An issuer of securities subject to an injunction is deprived of a regulation A exemption
under rule 252(c)(4) of regulation A, 17 C.F. R. 230.252(c)(4) (1980). Regulation A provides a
simplified form of registration which costs less to prepare and takes less time to complete than a
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from professional practice before the SEC , 288 or suspension and revocation of
broker-dealer registration."' Finally, violation of an injunction's prohibitions
may result in prosecution for criminal contempt. 290
Despite such potentially heavy burdens imposed on those subject to SEC
injunctions, a negligence standard of culpability nevertheless would better pro-
mote the policies of the securities laws while not inflicting unreasonable harm.
This is so, however, only if the two-tier standard of the common law is applied
consistently. Negligent conduct should be governed only by prophylactic equi-
table remedies. Punitive remedies, arising in subsequent administrative or
judicial proceedings, should apply only to conduct involving some element of
scienter. 291 Additionally, unfairness to defendants would be minimal if the past
pattern of judicial discretion were continued. Courts, consistent with the protec-
tive, rather than punitive purposes of injunctions, have granted relief to the
Commission only where there exists a "reasonable likelihood" of future viola-
tions. 292 Thus, in order to obtain an injunction, the Commission must produce
evidence sufficient to warrant the inference that future violations are likely to
occur.293 "An important factor in this regard is the degree of intentional wrong-
doing evident in a defendant's past conduct." 294 With this background, it is
difficult to appreciate the wisdom of substituting an inflexible scienter require-
ment for sound judicial discretion when the circumstances of securities law
"fraud" cases vary so widely. The protection offered by the equitable discretion
of the courts and the scienter requirement for punitive remedies would allow
effective enforcement under a negligence standard without imposing unfair
burdens on defendants.
registration statement prepared pursuant to section 5 of the 1933 Act. In addition, section 9(a)(2)
of the Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. 80(a)-9(a)(2)(1976), prohibits anyone subject to an
injunction from serving as an employee or official of a registered investment company. The Com-
mission, however, may waive these disqualifications pursuant to rule 252(f) under regulation A,
17 C.F.R. 230.252(f) (1980) and Investment Company Act 9(c), 15 U.S.C. 5 80a-9(c) (1976).
288 See SEC Rule 2(e)(3)(i), 17 C.F.R. 5 201.2(e)(3)(i) (1980).
289 See, 5 15(b)(4)(C) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 5 78o(b)(4)(C)
(1976).
A notice and hearing must precede suspension or revocation of a broker-dealer registration. Id.
290 See, e.g., Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147 (1969).
291 Courts have concurred in the proposition that the harsher the ancillary remedy's
impact on the defendant, the more restrictions should be placed on its use. See, e.g. , SEC v. Manor
Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1105-06 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v. Advance Growth Capital
Corp., 470 F.2d 40, 54 (7th Cir. 1972).
292 See, e.g., Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 703 (Burger, C. J., concurring). SEC v.
Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 807(2d Cir. 1975); SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers,
Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1100-01 (2d Cir. 1972).
293 Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. at 701. Courts have denied injunctive relief where the
defendant's misconduct was an isolated occurrence, or merely a momentary lapse from due care.
See, e.g., SEC v. Bangor Punta Corp., 331 F. Supp. 1154, 1162 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), modified, 480
F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 924 (1973).
294 Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. at 701. See COLUMBIA NOTE, supra note 241, at 343. Even
in circuits which purported to apply a negligence standard of culpability, the SEC has usually
been required to prove defendant's scienter in order to be granted injunctive relief. See, e.g. , SEC
v. Bangor Punta Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 406 (2d Cir. 1973) (Mansfield, J., concurring), cert, denied,
414 U.S. 924 (1973); SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1100-01, 1101-02
(2d Cir. 1972).
630	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 22:595
The Aaron Court refused to consider the policy issues involved in determin-
ing the proper culpability standard under section 10(b) for Commission injunc-
tions. In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger indicated that the Court
considered the issue closed to further judicial discussion: "Ii]f, as intimated, the
result is 'bad' public policy, that is the concern of Congress where changes can
be made."'" The ALI Federal Securities Code provides that the Commission,
unlike private parties seeking damages, may obtain an injunction to prevent
deception and misrepresentation without proof of scienter. 295
 In light of the fore-
going criticisms of Aaron's reasoning and holding, it is hoped that Congress will
adopt the conclusions of the ABA in its future consideration of the proposed
Federal Securities Code.
CONCLUSION
Proof of scienter should not be required in Commission injunctive proceed-
ings to enforce the prohibitions of section 10(b). In Aaron, the Court relied on the
language and legislative history of section 10(b) in determining that proof of
scienter was required under that provision regardless of the identity of the plain-
tiff or the nature of relief sought. This conclusion is not mandated by the
language or legislative history of section 10(b), which is ambiguous as it bears on
this issue. Thus, other means of discerning legislative intent are appropriate.
The statutory scheme of SEC enforcement remedies reflects the common law's
tradition of broader culpability standards when equitable relief is sought. This
broader standard is supported by consistent and longstanding administrative
construction which has enjoyed Congressional approval. Finally, a broad
culpability standard for Commission injunctive actions would promote the
policies of the 1933 and 1934 Acts by enabling the SEC to enforce the securities
laws flexibly and efficiently without imposing unfair burdens on defendants or
unduly restricting full disclosure of corporate information.
FREDERICK F. EISENBIEGLER
29 ' 446 U.S. at 703 (Burger, C. J., concurring).
296 See ALI Federal Securities Code $S 202(61), 202(96), 1602(a), 1819(a)(3), 1819(a)(4)
(Official Draft, Mar. 15, 1978).
